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PREFACE
Much of the information required in writing this
thesis was acquired during my service as a Peace Corps
volunteer in Kenya from January 196? to December 1968»
My work in Kenya as a government officer in agriculture
took me to many different areas of the country where I
met a great variety of people.

I spoke kiSwahili, the

lingua franca of East Africa, as well as smatterings of the
Kikuyu, Abaluhya, Kalenjin and Masai tribal languages.

I

drank "sundowners" of scotch and soda with European
settlers on the veranda overlooking the garden and moon
shine whiskey (changa) with Africans in the slums of
Nairobi. I ate roast turkey with the Indian High Commis
sioner at the American Ambassador's residence and roast
mutton with spear-carrying Masai over an open fire some
where north of Ngorigaishi, I had what is known as a
"cross-cultural experience."

It is to the many people of

Kenya who helped make that experience so memorable and fine
that I dedicate this thesis.

ii
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INTRODUCTION
The intent of this thesis is to present an
analytical description of the society of Kenya, with
emphasis on the politics of that country during the current
century.

The principal tool of analysis chosen to accom

plish the description of Kenya is the social group: a
collection of people bound by "formal, institutionalized
rules and characteristic, informal behavior.
In selecting what seem to be the significant social
groups in Kenya, the author discerned that all of the
groups chosen shared a similarity relative to the bindings
which hold each group together in itself and apart from
other groups. These group bindings proved to be a social
phenomenon called "primordial attachments.Primordial
attachments, or bindings or ties, stem from the "givens"
(or assumed "givens") of social existence such as kinship,
H. S, Morris, "Ethnic Groups," in International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills
(New York: The Macmillan Co. and the Free Press, I960),
Vol. V, p. 68.
^S'ee Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution:
Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New
States," in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for
Modernity in^Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York:
The Free Press, 1963).
1
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3

language, race, religion and custom.

Primordial ties

exist wherever there is an assemblage of people living
together and regenerating themselves.

But in Kenya certain

primordial bonds, such as those of race, religion, caste
and tribe, have served as bases for a recruitment of indi
viduals into social groups.

Since not all social groups

are based on primordial ties (class ties, for example, also
promote social groups), those social groups which are based
on primordial ties may be said to constitute a special
class or type of social group.

It follows reasonably that

this special type of social group should be called the pri
mordial group.

Thus it may be stated that in selecting

what seem to be the significant social groups in Kenya the
author discerned that all of the groups selected were
primordial groups.
It is the assumption of this thesis that the concept
of primordial groups provides a useful tool for social
analysis in Kenya.

A description of the social relation

ships between and among the primordial groups provides an
instrument for understanding Kenya's society. Such a
description serves, moreover, to define the type of society
characteristic in Kenya.

Generally, this society has been

one of distinct primordial groups which lacked a common
value consensus. It has been a society of primordial groups
^See Geertz, pp. 109-113•
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whose relationships were specific and limited and often
conflicting in nature. Such a society has been termed by
some authors a "'plural society."^
The order of this paper will be to introduce the
primordial groups in Kenya, to utilize these groups in an
analysis of Kenya's recent history, and to conclude with a
discussion of the distinctive qualities of primordial
groups as political groups and the possible benefits to be
gained in utilizing primordial groups in the analyses of
other societies.
^See p, 108, footnote 1 below.
Several varied and somewhat conflicting defini
tions of the concept of ^pluralism" exist in the social
sciences. Thus the "plural society" as it is used in this
thesis should not be confused with other definitions of the
concept. For discussions of the various definitions of
pluralism see Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Pluralism and
Polity: A Theoretical Exploration," in Pluralism in Africa,
eds. Keo Kuper and M. G. Smith (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1969)> pp. 67-81; and
Francis W. Coker, "Pluralism," in Encyclopaedia of the
Social Sciences, ed„ Edwin R. Seligman (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), Vol. II, pp. 170-174.

CHAPTER I
PRIMORDIAL GROUPS OF KENYA
In this chapter the author will first introduce
the subject for analysis, the Republic of Kenya.

An

attempt will then be made to identify and describe five
sets of primordial groups in Kenya.
Ai Short Introduction to Kenya
The Republic of Kenya is a Texas-size country situ
ated on the equator and the eastern coastline of the
African continent.

The northern three-fifths of the

country is arid, but the southern portion contains a lush
coastal belt and a 3,000- to 10,000-foot interior plateau
where most people engage in agricultural activity, the main
source of Kenya's income.
Some writers combine Kenya with two neighboring
countries—Tanzania and Uganda—and refer to this as East
Africa,1 an area which shares a similar history and some
common economic and political ties. Our concern, however,
is with Kenya per se and although the roots of the story
1 Called British East Africa before the three
countries became independent African nations,
4
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extend deep into pre-colonial history, the boundaries of
our unit of analysis are the borders which the British drew
in making Kenya a protectorate and colony near the end of
the 19th Century.
The Idea of "Kabla" or Type
British rule established borders or divisions not
only between Kenya and neighboring countries, but also
between people living in Kenya itself.

The essence of

colonial rule in Kenya, as in the remainder of Africa, was
"not economic or political domination . , . but racial
subordination,"2

The idea of racial divisions^ according

to skin pigmentation served as the foundation for the
colonial social system and set patterns for psychological,
social and political behavior in Kenya.

Cultural and

economic differences also coincided with racial boundaries
and created ritualistic caste-like relationships such as
^Victor Co Ferkiss, Africa's Search for Identity
(Cleveland^ The World Publishing Company, 1966), pi 77.
3"Race" as it is utilized in this paper means
. . a human group that defines itself and/or is defined
by other groups as different from other groups by virtue
of innate and immutable physical characteristics. These
physical characteristics are in turn believed to be
intrinsically related to moral, intellectual, and other
non-physical attributes or abilities." Pierre L. van den
Berghe, Race and Racism: A, Comparative Perspective
(New York! John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 9.
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that of master and servant»^
Since the beginning of colonial days, the most
common and important racial groups as perceived by the
people of Kenya themselves are the Asians, Africans and
Europeans.

Thus the society can, to a remarkable degree,

be defined by the relationships which have developed among
these three groups.
It would be a mistake, however, to limit the social
analysis to the racial groups only; for subgroups, found
within the racial boundaries, are also important»

The

Swahili word kabla, meaning literally "type" or "kind,"
has a common and interesting usage in Kenya and the ques
tions "Wewe ni kabla gani?" (What kind are you?) and "Yeye
ni kabla gani?" (What kind is he?) are often heard.

If an

African is asked what ""kind" he is, he will invariably
give his own "type" as one of tribe.

Thus:

"Mirai ni

Gikuyu (au Masai au Elgeyo)" ioe. "I am a Kikuyu (or Masai
or Elgeyo)If an African is asked about another African,
the answer will once again be one of tribe.

If he is asked

about a non-African, however, his answer will be one of
race.

Thus:

"Yeye ni Mzungu (au Muhindi)" i.e. "He is a

European (or an Asian)."
^See David E. Apter's description of this type of
phenomenon in Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A
Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 47«
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The author found himself doing much the same in
Kenya.

He answered that he was an American and other

whites were Britishers or Germans or Italians or whatever.
Non-Europeans were, before the author began to recognize
subracial groupings, obviously Asians or Africans.^

The

point here is that, while people in Kenya consider others
of a different color to belong to racial groups, they con
sider themselves and those of a similar color to belong
to subracial divisions.

Very clear-cut subracial groups

are found among the Africans in their tribes and among
Asians in their caste-sect bodies.

The Europeans, who

have been and are yet today predominantly British, have
exhibited an overall group behavior common enough to pre
clude any distinct subracial groups.
The Asian Racial Group
The term "Asian," while commonly used in Kenya, is
not always carefully defined.

Sometimes Arabs are called

Asians and sometimes the Roman Catholic Goans are not. For
this paper, however, the Asian racial group will comprise
all those people (including Goans) who came from or trace
their ancestry to the countries of India and Pakistan.
^There is one interesting inconsistency to this
racial, subracial group analysis, A black American is in
variably termed a European by everyone in Kenya; yet an
African, though he may be American-educated and Americandressed, is always and forever an African.
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Some confusion results also from the fact that
before the 1947 partition of India into the two separate
countries of India and Pakistan all Asians had been called
""Indians,"

Thereafter, because of the new restricted mean

ing of the term "Indian," the expression "Asian" came into
wide use throughout all of East Africa.

Much of the

research material used in this study was written before
1947» however, and even some of that material written after
1947 persists in using the term "Indian."

Thus the reader

will note that in several quotations the author has pointed
out that "Indian" as it is being used is synonymous with
"Asian" as the author wishes to use it.
The latest official census in Kenya puts the Asian
population at 176,613,^ which is approximately 2.0% of the
nation's total.

Approximately 85% of the Asians live in

Kenya's five largest cities,7 and the following table shows
the high Asian percentage of the populations in Kenya's ten
largest towns.

T. Ward Morgan and N. Manfred Shaffer, Popula
tion of Kenya: Density and Distribution (Nairobi: Oxford
University Press, 1966), p. 3.
^Dharam P. Ghai, "An Economic Survey," in Portrait
of a Minority: Asians in East Africa, ed. Dharam P. Ghai
(Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 196$), p. 93«
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TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN POPULATION IN KENYA'S
TEN LARGEST TOWNSa
Total
Population

Asian
Percentage

City

Asians

Nairobi
Mombasa
Nakuru
Kisumu
Eldoret
Thika
Nanyuki
Kitale
Nyere
Kericho

86,453
43 ,713
6,203
8,355
3 ,75a
2,336
982
2,065
1 ,147
593

266,794
179,517
38,181
23,526
19,605
13,952
10,448
9,342
7,857
7,692

32..4
24..3
16<.2
35..5
19..1
16,.7
9<.4
22..1
14.,6
7..7

155 ,605

576,972

26.9
(ave,)

TOTALS

^Figures taken from Morgan and Shaffer, Table 3 >
p. 5.
Yet, although the Asian population is urban, it is
also spread throughout the country.

Each of the forty

administrative districts in Kenya showed some Asian popula
tion in 1962, ranging from three Asians in a total of 75,526
people in Mandera District (in the extreme northeast section
of the country) to 86,922 Asians in a population of 314,760
g
in Nairobi Extra-Provincial District,
Anyone traveling
the remote backcountry of Kenya can anticipate a duka
(general store), Dukawalla (the Asian owner and operator),
and his family at the next settlement or crossroads.
^Morgan and Shaffer, Table 1, p. 3«
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Several factors have tended to promote amalgama
tion and unity in the Asian group.
1,

These are?

A predominant language-—Gujerati--which

originates f rom the Gujerat region of Northwest India and
is spoken by about 70% of the Asians in Kenya.
2,

A similar socio-economic position; for although

there are richer and poorer Asians, the group in general
has been situated somewhat above the Africans in the hier
archy and somewhere below the Europeans.
3.

The tendency already mentioned for both Africans

and Europeans to view the Asians as a single group.
4.

The common practice of the government to treat

the Asians as a single group.
The Asian Caste-Sect Groups
In spite of such unifying pressures, internal divi9
sions have developed and persisted among the Asians.
Religious differences account for a Sikh Group, a Roman
Catholic Goan Group, and several sect groupings within the
Muslim religious category.Within the Hindu religious
^For a very detailed work on Asians in East Africa
see H. S. Morris, The Indians in Uganda (Chicago: The Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1968). A discussion of the paral
lel divisive propensity among Asians in Great Britain is
found in Rashmi Desai, Indian Immigrants in Britain
(London; Oxford University Press, 1963)"
^% category is a mere classification of a collec
tion of people and should not be confused with a group as
the author uses this latter concept.
The major caste groups among the Muslims are; the

TABLE 2
THE ASIANS OF KENYA*
Religious
Category

Group

Language

Place of
Origin

Popu
lation

Hindu

Several
castes

Gujerati

Gujerat

97,800

Muslim

Several
sects

Gujerati

Gujerat

40,100

Roman
Catholics

Goans

Konkoni

Goa

16,000

Clerks, professional
people

Sikh

Punjabi

Punjab

21,200

Mechanics, carpen
ters, railwaymen,
businessmen

Principal
Occupations
Traders, government
officials, craftsmen,
businessmen
Teachers, profession
als , traders, planta
tion owners

^This table is adapted from Table 16, p. 132, Irving Kaplan ^ al.,
Area Handbook for Kenya (Washington, D.C.; The American University /Foreign
Area Studies/, July 1967). The population figures are from the 1962 Census.
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category are found several groups which formed along tradi
tional caste lines,Table 2 above shows a breakdown of
the Asians.
The interesting division along caste rather than
religious lines among Hindus resulted probably from the
system of social exclusiveness in India which was "'insti12
tutionalized in the caste system and not in religion.^
The traditional caste system in India is based upon a ranked
division of social labor but all that remains in Kenya is
the caste exclusiveness,
Hindu religious leaders also lack the group-building
tool available to Muslim and Christian leaders in the
ability to promise exclusive salvation to one's followers
and everlasting damnation to non-believers,^^
Multiple reasons exist for the divisiveness of the
Asian racial group generally, and for strong subracial
Shia Ismailia Khoja, Sunni Hannafi, Shia Bohara, Shia
Ithnasheri Khoja and Sunni Eschafei, The Ismailia Khoja
(followers of the Aga Khan) are especially notable as a
progressive and influential group both in Kenya and
throughout East Africa,
11

The most prominent of the Hindu caste groups are:
the Brahmin, Vania, Lohana, Patildar and Jains,
(H, S, Morris writes that: "'Strictly speaking Jains are
not Hindus, though in East Africa they are counted among the
Hindus as opposed to Muslims," See Morris, The Indians in
Uganda, p. 190,)
I^Morris, The Indians in Uganda, p, 62,
l^lbid.
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caste-sect groups which have developed.
1.

These are:^^

The proximity of Kenya to India and Pakistan

with a resulting ease in communications.

Old divisions

could thus remain relevant and social exclusive policies
such as caste or sect endogamy were made possible,
2.

The size of the Asian racial group, which

became large enough to allow for factions.
3.

The ambitions of factional leaders.

4.

Business ties, which came to correspond to

religious and caste ties.
5.

The existence of a "pace setter" group, the

Shia Imami Ismailia Muslims. This group began early and
in earnest to develop sect schools, hospitals and churches.
6. Inadequate government support in the develop
ment of Asian schools.

The burden for school construction

thus fell to the caste-sect groups and the resulting segre
gated school system served thereafter to strengthen and
maintain the subracial ties,
7.

An early failure and resulting lost opportunity

to unite before social conflict developed between Asians
and the other two racial groups in Kenya.

This provides a

key to understanding why Asians have not united in the
^^Ibid., pp. 25-44; Morris, "Communal Rivalry
Among Indians in Uganda," The British Journal of Sociology,
VIII, No. 4 (December 1957), 306-317»
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face of pressures from Europeans and Asians.
Lewis A. Goser in his book The Function of Social
Conflict writes: "The degree of group consensus prior to
the outbreak of the conflict seems to be the most important
factor affecting cohesion.

If a group is lacking in basic

consensus, outside threat leads not to increased cohesion,
but to general apathy, and the group is consequently
threatened with disintegration."^^
An important activity carried on by the caste-sect
groups has been that of political interest articulation and
pressure.

They have attempted to influence government

policies and programs especially on issues of education,
sectarian mosque and temple land, and sectarian graveyards.
As very small minorities with vulnerable business interests,
the caste-sect groups did not press hard on sensitive
issues such as government immigration laws and racial
segregation.

Their very smallness, too, prevented these
groups from functioning as political parties.16

^^Lewis A. Goser, The Functions of Social Conflict
(Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956), p. 93•
^^For a description of caste-sect group political
activity see Morris, The Indians in Uganda, pp. 25-44.
See also George Bennett and Carl G. Rosberg's comment on
Asian "political communalism" below, pp. S5-Ô6..
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The African Racial Group
The Africans in 1962 constituted 97% of Kenya's
population with a total of 8,365,942 people.^7

Africans

in Kenya are often classified into four large language
1A
categories: Bantu, Nilo-Hamitic, Nilotic and Hamitic.
R, C, Thurnwald has devised what is probably a more useful
method for social analyses by dividing Kenya's Africans
into two broad collections:

Pastorals i.e. livestock
1Q
herders, and Peasants i.e. mixed agriculturalists. ^ This
Pastoral-Peasant partition has meaning in that the economic
activity of each category is attached to distinct socio
political patterns.

Traditionally, the nomadic Pastorals

have been stronger and better organized in war than the
more sedate Peasants.
For this study, however, the African tribal groups
are more important than either the linguistic divisions or
Thurnwald's socio-economic categories.

Relatively little

I^Morgan and Shaffer, p. 4.
^%ee, for example. Lord Hailey, An African Survey
(London; Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 28-43 ; also
Carl G. Rosberg Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of "Mau
Mau": Nationalism in Kenya, Published for The Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford Univer
sity, Stanford, California (New York and Washington:
Frederick A, Praeger, Publishers, 1966)5 p. 2. This lin
guistic division comes from C. G. Seligman, Races of
Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1930)«
''^See Ro C. Thurnwald, Black and White in East
Africa (London; Routledge, 1935).
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meaning can be attached to the fact that President Kenyatta
and opposition leader Oginga Odinga belong respectively to
the Bantu and Nilotic language divisions or that they are
both members of the Peasant category.

It is important to

realize, however, that Mr. Kenyatta is a Kikuyu and
Mr. Odinga a Luo.

The development of each man's personality

was largely conditioned by a fostering tribal culture; and
the position of each man today (one in power and the other
under arrest) is the result to a large degree of different
tribal membership.
The African Tribal Groups
Anthropologists have correctly pointed to the fact
that the concept of "tribe" is rather inexact. Thus Paul
Bohannan writes;
Some African tribes are what have been described as
village states; others are empires of several million
people spread over hundreds of thousands of square
miles. Some African tribes are language groups; some
are congeries of indefinite or indiscriminate groups
that have been classified under a term, usually
pejorative, by their n e i g h b o r s . 2 1
In the process of colonizing Africa, the Europeans,
who did not understand the ambiguity of the tribal concept,
drew "tribal" boundaries which did not necessarily correspond
^'^This importance of tribal membership will be
discussed in Chapter IV.
N.Y,;

Paul Bohannan, Africa and Africans (Garden City,
The Natural History Press, 1964)» pp• 124-125.
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to social reality»

These boundaries were made sharp in

Kenya in accordance with the British policy of Indirect
Rule whereby the colonists utilized tribal political insti
tutions (or created them if necessary) in order to admin
ister the African population.
British "divide and rule" tactics also served to
crystallize unstable tribal relations.
22

a former African leader in Kenya,

The late Tom Mboya,

wrote:

The European colonial powers and even missionaries
for a long time tended to build up tribal antagonism.
It made it easier to influence people if they could
find an amenable tribe to use against another tribe
which was hostile.^3
Evidence of British use of "divide and rule" tactics was
found in the preponderance of certain tribes in and the
exclusion of other tribes from the colonial army and police
in Kenya.
An important point here is that whatever their
historical roots and however they were changed or crystal
lized by foreign manipulation, tribes are important in
Kenya today.

Individual Africans think of themselves as

belonging to a certain tribe.

Tribal membership has,

^^Mr. Mboya was assassinated in Nairobi on July 5>
1969.
23Tom Mboya, Freedom and After (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1963), p. 65. It is Mboya's position thus,
that tribal antagonisms were the result, at least in part,
of deliberate British practices.
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moreover, a definite effect on the behavior of the indi
vidual.

A Kibuyu does not talk, dress, act or think

exactly like a Masai, or Nandi, or Taita,

Each tribe has

some distinct social institutions which regulate behavior
both within the group and with outsiders.
The ambiguity of the concept of tribe has prevented
writers from agreeing on how many tribes exist in Kenya,
A tribal distribution map found in the Kenya population
study by W, T. W, Morgan and N, Manfred Shaffer (which is
reproduced as Appendix A for this paper) shows forty-five
tribes.Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham in their book

The Myth of Mau Mau write of "twenty-seven main tribal
groupings."25
Table 3 contains, however, the largest and most
commonly recognized (by both Kenyans and outsiders) African
tribal groups.

Included also are both language categories

and Thurnwald's basic economic activity.

These economic

activity designations should, however, be viewed with
caution.

The manner in which Africans acquire food and

money is rapidly changing in Kenya,This Pastoral-Peasant
^^Morgan and Shaffer, p. 33»
^^Rosberg and Nottingham, p, 2.
2^A good example of this change is found in the
Kipsigis Tribe which was originally pastoral. Many
Kipsigis are now tea farmers.
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label should be viewed mainly as the traditional major
economic activity of a tribe.
TABLE 3
MAJOR AFRICAN TRIBES OF KENYA*

Population

Tribe
Somali
Galla
Others

)
)
)

Turkana
Masai
Nandi
Kipsigis

300,000

Language
Category

Basic Economic
Activity

Hamitic

Pastoral

181 ,378
154,079
170,085
341,772

)
)
)
)

Nilo—
Hamitic

Pastoral

Mijikenda
Abaluhya
Gusii
Kikuyu
Kamba

414,887
1,086,409
538,343
1,642,065
933,219

)
)
)
)
)

Bantu

Peasant

Luo

1,148,335

Nilotic

Peasant

*The population statistics for this table come from
Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 1-7.
The European Racial Group
The Europeans do not have distinctive subracial
groups such as those found within the Asian and African
racial groups. Separate and exclusive institutions for
education or religion or the family system are not clearly
visible within the total European group. What has always
existed among Europeans in Kenya, on the contrary, is a
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general attitude which has established a common pattern of
action and a common response to the questions of why Euro
peans were in Kenya and how they should act toward other
people there.

This general attitude is prevalent enough and

so well established that it may be termed the European
27

Racist Syndrome.

The Syndrome is basically a justification for British
existence in Kenya as the bearers of Western civilization,
progress and religion.

Toward the Africans the Europeans

practiced (after the initial conquering effort) a paternal
istic

racism,2#

wherein the African was thought of as

"friendly, patient, cheerful, rather stupid, lazy, but
likeable, and of course entirely 'primitive. . .
Toward the Asian the practice was one of competitive racism,
wherein the Asians were thought of as poor but dangerous
27The European Racist Syndrome is most clearly
defined (and defended) in the writings of Elspeth Huxley,
a Kenyan settlerwoman. See especially her two-volume
biography of the European settler leader in Kenya, Lord
Delamere (White Man's Country ^/London: Chatto and Windus
Ltd., 193^71 and the book Race and Politics in Kenya
(London: Faber and Faber, 1955) which contains an exchange
of correspondence between Huxley and Margery Perham, a
critic of European race politics.
^^For a discussion of the concepts and practices
of paternalistic and competitive racism see van den Berghe,
Race and Racism.
E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society
(Kampala, Uganda; Department of Sociology, Makerere College,
The University College of East Africa, 1959)» p. 272.
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examples for ignorant Africans and obstacles to the white
man's effort and burden of "civilizing the natives.
Some attitudinal variations are clustered around
the four main European occupational categories: agricul
ture, the civil service, mission work and commerce.

Kenya's

white settler farmers have performed a function for the
Europeans similar to that of the Imami Ismailias in the
Asian group as "pace setters" for the race,31

Early

settlers such as Lord Delamere worked closely with British
colonial officers in defining and establishing the European
Racial Syndrome, And although some missionaries and civil
servants have been in sympathy with Africans as the
recipients of the ill effects of racist colonial rule, this
fact did not compromise their basically racist notions
about Asians and Africans or their participation in the
general European position.

They did not reject the Syndrome

during colonial days and many of those still in Kenya cling
to its basic racial tenet.
3C^ee pp. 29-39 below.
This is true even though the settlers have con
stituted only about 25% of the European group (and 10^ at
Independence) and are themselves somewhat heterogeneous in
that they contain a large minority (about 30%) of South
African whites (called Kaburus by Africans in Kenya).
See Kaplan et
, p. 51 and pp. 135= 139.
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Summary
The most significant social groups in Kenya have
now been identified.

Listed once again, they are:

1.

The African Racial Group

2.

The African Tribal Groups

3.

The Asian Racial Group

4o

The Asian Caste-Sect Groups

5.

The European Racial Group

This chapter has also contained a description of
the primordial attachments which bind the individuals of
each group—the attachments of race, tribe, caste and
religion.

Thus these five sets of groups may now be termed

the primordial groups of Kenya and utilized in the following
discussion of Kenya's history.

CHAPTER II
A PRIMORDIAL GROUP ANALYSIS OF
KENYA'S MODERN HISTORY
An attempt is made in the following chapter to
analyze Kenya's modern history (since the late 19th Cen
tury).

The method used is to focus on the relationships

between and among the five sets of primordial groups
introduded in Chapter I,
Background:

The Pre-Colonial Period

It is certain that man has been living in that area
of Africa which was to become Kenya for many thousands of
years. Some archeologists believe, in fact, that man in his
i

present form originated in the East African region.

Firm

archeological evidence shows that early iron-age civiliza
tions existed in Kenya around 700 A.D. and possible evidence
puts iron-users there at a much earlier date—in about the
^The findings and conclusions of Dr. L. S. B. Leakey
support this idea. See: Basil Davidson, A History of East
and Central Africa (New York: Anchor Booksl 1969)» pp. 4-7;
L. S. B. Leakey, The Progress and Evolution of Man in
Africa (London; Oxford University Press, 1961); and Leakey,
Olduvai Gorge (Cambridge: University Press, 1965).
23
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3rd Century A.D.

2

Early Tribal Relations
The study of early African history is made difficult
by a lack of written records. It seems certain, however,
that by I5OO A.D. or earlier the direct ancestors of the
modern African tribes in Kenya were already there and in
creasing in numbers.3

After 1500, and more especially

after I8OO, tribal conflict expanded in Kenya.

These

struggles were probably the result of growing populations
which demanded more livestock and an increased grazing
area.

Notable successive expansive movements were made

southward into Kenya by the Masai, Turkana and Somali
tribes.

The strength of these pastoral peoples made them

very difficult for the agriculturists to repel.
Several different types of internal tribal authority
existed at this time, but the general trend was toward a
centralization of the political system as the conflict
increased.^

The strongest tribe in Kenya before the Euro

pean ingress was, however, the Masai, who never did develop
a system of centralized political control.

At the height

^Davidson, pp. 8-10, 34.
3lbid., pp. 37, 167-177.
4lbid., pp. 167-177.
5a discussion of the Masai system of authority
based on laibons or priests is found in Davidson, pp. 72-73»
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of their power (early in the 19th Century) the Masai con
trolled an area of Kenya about 500 miles long and 150 miles
wide.^
Early Asian-African Relations
Asians have been in contact with East Africa and
the people living there for at least two thousand years.
The earliest reference to their presence, which was as
traders along the coastline, is found in a Greek merchant's
guide book written in approximately 120 A.D, and entitled
Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (Guide to the North-West
Indian Ocean).^

Asians cooperated with Arabs in commer

cial ventures (including slavery) both before the 8th Cen
tury A.D. when Arabs made temporary settlements along the
coast and afterwards when they began to construct permanent
cities,
Asian economic activity continued in East Africa
through the Portuguese domination of main coastal cities
during the 1500's, through a subsequent Arab resurgence,
and into the development of British occupation which began
^Rosberg and Nottingham, p.
described in this book as the tribe
edly played the most important role
political geography of Kenya before
(P. A-)O

4» The Masai are
having "... undoubt
in shaping the
the British occupation"

^Davidson, p. 26. Authoritative histories of the
Asians in Africa can be found in Davidson and in Hailey.
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in the late 19th Century,
A pattern emerges from this long history of Asians
in Africa,

Chanan Singh, a Kenyan Asian, writes:

Concentrating upon economic enterprise, they
/the Asian_s7 had adapted themselves in turn to the
indigenous coastal chiefs, to the Arabs, to the
Portuguese, to the Arabs again and » . „ to the
British and Germans, /This German presence was in
Tanganyika^/ To all these regimes they had been
to a greater or less degree, economically indispen
sable,®
Yet although they "adapted themselves" to the regime of the
day, Asians never merged to become an integral part of
either the powerful alien or the indigenous African social
system.

Throughout this period the Asians remained separate,

a group apart.

Unlike the Arabs and Portuguese, they did

not marry Africans, and unlike all of the other foreigners
they did not exert a political influence.

They limited

themselves, rather, to business affairs and to the few
social contacts inherent in that activity.
The seed of African dislike for Asians must have
been planted near the very beginning of their relationship.
The Asian brought exotic goods, cloth and matches and metal
pots for the African to purchase.

He did not mix well or

easily, however, and his conversation was usually limited
^Chanan Singh, "The Historical Background," in
Portrait of a Minority; Asians in East Africa, ed.
Dharam P. Ghai (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 196$),
p 0 A- ®
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to bartering or to ordering other Africans who carried his
wares.

He must have been, from the very beginning,

tolerated but distrusted.
The Colonial Period (I888-I963)
This historical epoch contains the story of the
British establishment of a plural society in Kenya.

The

era begins and ends with European-African conflict, the
former over the formation of Kenya as a colony, and the
latter in the achievement of Kenya's independence,

A

European-Asian struggle dominated group relationships
during much of the time inbetween.
Initial African-European Conflict
. . There were few sections of the country that
did not experience some violent confrontation with
European-led expeditions against them,"9
Under the auspice first of the Imperial East Africa
Company and later of the British Foreign Office, the Euro
peans moved in to take Kenya by force,

Rosberg and Notting

ham list thirteen different tribes (ten of which are
included among the major tribes in Table 3) which attempted
to resist the British but which were eventually overcome,
^Rosberg and Nottingham, p. 7.
^^Ibid,, pp. 7-16, The hardest fight was put up by
the Kalenjin group of tribes, especially the Nandi. Resis
tance was not offered by the Masai, who bargained rather
than fought.

2ê

Two divergent pressures resulted from the European
victory.

The first was toward a greater unification among

the African tribes.

Colonial status meant a central govern

ment at Nairobi with a relatively general administrative
system for taxes, budgeting, crime, etc. throughout the
country.

The common languages of English and kiSwahili

were spread, and there was finally decreased tribal conflict
under British rule.
The second pressure was toward the preservation and
strengthening of tribal division through the employment of
the concept of Indirect Rule, a practice which was discussed
above (pp. 16-19)«

Kenya's international boundaries, more

over, were later to cause problems.

The international lines

as drawn in London split several tribes and related tribal
groupings.

The most notable of the divided tribes were the

Masai, Somali and Abaluhya.

The case of the Somali division

resulted eventually in war, when many of the 275,000 Somalis
11
residing in Kenya at independence
took up arms with the
aid of the Somali Republic Government and fought against
Republic of Kenya forces.

Although the Kenyatta Government

never acknowledged the fact (the rebels were always termed
shifta _/bandit^7)> this was a civil insurrection which
resulted directly from the British-drawn boundary between
Kenya and the Somali Republic.
I^Kaplan _et al., p. 368.
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European-Asian Relations
Europeans were not always unhappy about Asians
living in Kenya, although that attitude soon developed.
Early colonial administrators encouraged Asians to move
inland from the coast, and even settlers, later to become
bitter antagonists of Asians, were said to have initially
appreciated the need for Asian traders.1 2

This early

British hospitality for Asians rested on a need to develop
the Kenya Colony into an economic asset.

Initial British

investments were heavy in Kenya and the colonists looked to
Asians for assistance in opening up a market economy for the
country.
The most expensive of the early British investments
in Kenya was a railway, begun in Mombasa in 1Ô95 and con
structed across Kenya at a cost of E9,500 a mile.^^

Some

32,000 Asians were recruited in the British colony of India
and brought to Kenya for the construction effort, as it was
felt that Africans lacked even the basic skills required
for the work. Under the terms of the work contract, the
Asian coolies were granted the option of a return passage
to India or the right to stay in Kenya.

When the railroad

W. Hollingsworth, The Asians of East Africa
(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1960), pp. 52-53•
11
^Zoe Marsh and G. W. Kingsworth, An Introduction
to the History of East Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1966), p. T62.
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was completed after reaching Kisumu on Lake Nyanza (Victoria)
in 1901) 6,724 Asian workers stayed in Kenya, a figure which
added 19% to the Asian population.
The intermingling of the Asian and European elements
in Kenya produced eventually a conflict centered around four
issues;
1.

The reservation of the Highland Region for

European farmers only.
2. Urban racial segregation,
3.

"Communal" i.e. racial legislative represen

4.

Immigration policies.

tation.
15

An influx of white settlers into Kenya, beginning
around 1900, was quite important for the country's history.
Colonies throughout Africa which contained white settlers
^^Of the remaining workers, 2,000 died in Kenya and
the others returned to India, For a discussion of and
statistics on the railway construction see Morris, The
Indians of Uganda, p. Ô, and George Delf, Asians in East
Africa (London; Oxford University Press, 19^3)> PP« 1Ô14. A common misconception among both Africans and Euro
peans in Kenya is that all of the Asians in Kenya came
originally from this construction crew. (See, for example,
Elspeth Huxley, White Man's Country /2 vols.; London:
Chatto and Windus Ltd., 19^^/, I, pp. 6 4 - 6 5 . ) Morris com
ments on this myth in The Indians in Uganda, p. 9.
^^See Hollingsworth, p. 7 6 ; Hailey, p. 406; and
Carl G. Rosberg Jr., "Political Conflict and Change in
Kenya," in Transition in Africa; Studies in Political
Adaptation, ed. Gwendolen M. Carter and William 0. Brown
(Boston; Boston University Press, 195#), p. 3^o
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have been qualitatively different from colonies which did
not.^^

White settlers quickly tended to develop loyalties

to their new home and sought to exert an influence on its
future progress.

In Kenya (as elsewhere) the settlers began

early to demand a voice in the Colonial Government,

This

demand did not upset colonial officials because there was
originally little difference between settler and official
views on expanding white power in the colony.
The Highland area which attracted European settle17
ment comprises about 7>000,000 acres of land
suitable for
agriculture, and lies at an elevation high enough to give
it a temperate climate.

It was from this area that settlers

sought to bar Asian land purchases.

They initially accom

plished the prohibition through a partnership of
Sir Charles Eliot, the chief British representative in
Kenya from 1901 to 1904» and Lord Delamere, the leading
settler spokesman from his arrival in Kenya in 1903 to his
death in 1931»

In 1903, Eliot restricted Asian land owner

ship to small plots outside the Highland region,and in
^^See Leonard Thompson's article on "tropical"
colonies and "temperate" colonies in Africa for an inter
esting discussion of this point.
17

St, Clair Drake, "Some Observations on Interethnic Conflict As One Type of Intergroup Conflict,"'
Conflict Resolution, I, No. 2 (June 1957), 167.
1^George Bennett, Kenya; A Political History
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 13, also
M. P. K. Sorrenson, "Land Policy in Kenya: 1095-1945»" in
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1905 a Land Commission chaired by Delamere stated that
while there was
. . . no objection to the general proposition that
Indians /i.e. Asians/ should hold land in the
Protectorate . . . considering only a small area of
the Protectorate is suitable for European settle
ment and colonization, it is desireable that land
within that area /the Highlands/ should be reserved ,g
for the support and management of a white population.
These actions were then followed by the Elgin
Pledge of 1906 wherein Colonial Secretary Lord Elgin stated
somewhat lamely that:
It is not consonant with the view of His Majesty's
Government to impose legal restrictions on any par
ticular section of the community, but as a matter of
administrative convenience grants in the upland area
should not be made to Indians /i.e. Asian_s7.
The policy of land discrimination was then firmed up by the
Crowns Land Ordinance of 1915 which gave the Governor in
Kenya a veto power over cross-racial land exchanges, thus,
in practice, effectively barring Asians from the White
Highlands.
The question of political representation centered
on membership in the Legislative Council.

The Council,

History of East Africa, ed, Vincent Harlow, E. M. Chilver
and Alison Smith (London; Oxford University Press, 1965),
II, pp. 680-682,
1^Quoted in Singh, p, 6.
^^Quoted in Huxley, p, 209.
2"'See Sorrenson, pp. 600-682,
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which was in part locally elected, was created to advise
the Governor,

Many Europeans and Asians regarded it as

the forerunner to a parliamentary body under eventual selfrule <,

As the larger of the two contending racial groups,

the Asians pressed for representation in proportion to
population.

This ambition was successfully fought by the

Europeans.
The Asians did gain early representation on the
Council (1909) in the person of Mr. A. M« Jeevanjee, But
the communal type of representation employed in deciding
Council membership always left the Asians with many fewer
delegates than the Europeans. For Kenya as a whole, of
course, the reverse is true, as the Asian population has
22
always greatly outnumbered the European population.
Immigration policies and urban residential segre
gation were challenged by Asians on the principle of
23
equality before the law*
Here again, however* they met
??
The African group was not considered an important
or very worthy element in Kenya's society at this time.
The first African to serve on the Council, Mr, Eluid îfethu,
did not join the body until 1944.
^^Immigration policies, unlike residential segre
gation, did not, however, discriminate against Asians per
se. They did work a difficulty on the relatively poorer
Asian group by establishing a fee test» This fee was E$0
prior to 193# and E500 thereafter» See G. Kondapi, Indians
Overseas? 1838-1949 (Madras: Oxford University Press,
1951), p. l4$,
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with little success.

Inequality was, in fact, ingrained

throughout the law and custom of the land.

Discriminatory

legal distinctions were made in ordinances, judicial
administration and taxation as well as in political repre
sentation and residence.

Unofficial discrimination was

practiced in the imposition of unequal wage scales for
Asian and European personnel,
Much heated European rhetoric was directed against
the Asians for other reasons, too. Lord Delamere spoke of
the discouragement Asians gave to white settlement and
African economic development by "monopolizing" many lowincome jobs and small businesses.

Delamere proclaimed the

Asians to be a bad moral and religious influence on the
Africans.25

An Economic Commission Report of 1919, which

was signed by five settlers (including Delamere) and two
British colonial officials, publicized supposed Asian moral
depravity and cited them as carriers of disease and
inciters to crime and vice,

Elspeth Huxley describes the

Asians in 1935 as the most "persistent problem" for the
colony.Throughout all of this rhetoric, the European
Racial Syndrome may be discerned.
24see Kondapi; p. 355°
^^Huxley, I, pp. 206-208,
^^Ibid., pp. 6 4 - 6 5 ,

The position taken by the
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Europeans was that they themselves had come to Africa with
the good of the African in mind and that the Asians consti
tuted a threat to that good.
The Asian-European struggle led to two British
Government actions in the early 1920's? the Wood-Winterton
Agreement and the Devonshire White Paper.

The Wood-

Winterton Agreement is interesting in that it reveals the
prevailing mood among the settlers. In 1922, the Colonial
and Indian Offices in London made an attempt to settle the
European-Asian conflict by drawing up a report which was
named after Mssrs» Wood and Winterton, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretaries of the two offices.

This report called

fort
1.

The prohibition of urban segregation.

2.

An end to restricted immigration.

3.

A common European-Asian voting roll based on

education and property, and insuring at least 10% of the
Asians would be franchised.
4. Four seats for Asians on the Legislative
Council,27
Settler reaction to Wood-Winterton was furious.
created among them what Huxley called the "old Bostonian
^^Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 65-66,

It
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nd
spirit»"

A vigilance committee was formed to make contin

gency plans for armed action against the colonial government.
There were plans to seize the railway and telegraph and to
kidnap the Governor.

Before any of this could be put into

effect; however, delegations from the government and the
European and Asian groups traveled to London to aid the
British Government in producing the important Devonshire
White Paper of 1923»
This Paper, which was a declaration of policy by the
British Government, stated that:
1.

The European monopoly on the Highlands would

2.

There were to be no immigration restrictions

remain,

on Asians as such*
3.

The official policy of urban segregation was

4.

Eleven Europeans, five Asians and one Arab were

to end,

to be elected to the Legislative Council.
5»

African interests were paramount

This final provision, dealing with African interests,
has in retrospect been the most important»

The key sentence

of the White Paper readsî
OÙ.

For a detailed discussion of the reaction see
Huxley, I, pp. 110-139»
^%ollingsworth, pp. 99-1 Oâ.
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Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His
Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely
to record their considered opinion that the interests
of the African natives must be paramount, and that
if, and when, those interests and the interests of
the immigrant races should conflict the former should
prevail.
In announcing African paramountry the British Government
rejected for Kenya, by strong implication at least, what
eventually came about in both South Africa and Southern
Rhodesia: the emergence of political rule by a small Euro
pean minority.
In their colonial-period struggle with Europeans,
30
the Asians both gained victories and suffered defeats.
The most obvious failure was in never achieving equal
status with the Europeans whom they greatly outnumbered.
The Asians received only five members in the Legislative
Council by the Devonshire White Paper of 1923 and one mem
ber thereafter.

The imbalance was made more grievous by

the fact that during the same period of time, from 1923 to
1963, the Asian population increased eightfold.

When a

common roll was finally achieved in 196O, it was primarily
a result of African rather than Asian pressure.

It was

the Africans, too, who broke the racial barrier to land
purchase in the Highlands.

Another Asian failure is

demonstrated in the fact that the principle of integrated
^'^This discussion of success and failure is based
on Delf, pp. 41-42.

3Ô
education was never fully accepted while Kenya was a colony.
It may be concluded thus that in general the disadvantages
for the darker races in Kenya either remained or were
solved by reasons other than Asian pressure.
Much of the explanation for Asian failures springs
from the certainty that in combating the Europeans, and
especially the settlers, the Asians were up against a foe
which fought with unusual energy, fierce self-interest and
only slightly restricted tactics.

The Asians, meanwhile,

were conscious of India's poverty and colonial status, were
often relatively poor and ill-educated, and were, most
importantly, internally divided.
The greatest contribution of the Asian group in
its struggle was the restraint placed upon any European
movement toward "self rule."
writes:

As the historian George Bennett

"It may well be that it was only their /the

Asians^y rivalry which prevented the Europeans from estab
lishing their position in Kenya as in places further
south."

Asian opposition to the Europeans combined with

smallness of the European Racial Group and the insistence
of Africans to bring uhuru.
^^Bennett, Kenya:
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A Political History, p. 47.

^^Uhuru is the Swahili word for freedom, and in
this common context it refers to freedom from colonial
rule or to independence.
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A few Asians, such as M. A. Desai (a journalist),
Isher Dass (a politician) and Makan Singh (a labor
organizer), gave outright aid to radical Africans,33 but
it was the indirect aid of Asian opposition to European
domination which counted most.

The significance of re

straining the European group was recognized early by Asians»
Thus in 1929, the President of a common Asian organization
known at the time as the East African Indian National Con
gress (EAINC) commented on the 1923 Devonshire White Paper;
However galling the decision of the Imperial
Government regarding the claims put forward by
Indians might have been to Indian self respect, it
was felt that the acceptance of the paramountcy of
native interests as the cornerstone of British
policy in East Africa removed the danger of control
passing into the hands of an oligarchy of alien
settlers.34
Asian Caste-Sect Relations and
the Weakness of the EAINC
The EAINC was created in 1914 to act as an inter
mediary in communications between the Kenya Government and
the Asian caste-sect groups and to serve as a voice of
appeal to the British and Indian Governments.^^

The EAINC,

33see Singh, pp. 1-11.
^^Written by Mr. Pandit H. N. Kunzru, and quoted in
Roger K. Tangri, "Asians in Kenya: A Political History,"
Africa Quarterly, VI (July-September 1966), 110.
35india was of course at this time a British
colony, and the appeal went to the Secretary of State for
India in the British Cabinet,
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rather than possessing significant central authority, how
ever, was based upon strong local organizations.^^

This

localism in combination with the social divisiveness of
the Asians rendered the association to the position of no
more than a very weak spokesman.

The EAINC was renamed

the Kenya Indian Congress in 1952, but this did not change
its lack of vigor.
Final African-European Conflict:
The State of Emergency and
Independence
The final decade of colonial rule in Kenya was
marked by a violent struggle of African guerrilla fighters
called the Mau Mau against British forces.This fight
did not suddenly appear without a process of maturation,
of course, for although the European-Asian conflict had
held center stage, there had been for many years a growing
African resentment over European policies in Kenya.

The

3%or example, the Indian Association of Mombasa,
which was formed in 1900, long before the EAINC.
^^A discussion of the EAINC is found in Yash Tandon,
"A Political Survey," in Portrait of a Minority: Asians
in East Africa, ed„ Dharam P. Ghai (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 196$), pp. 71-75» Tandon stresses "divide
and rule" tactics used by Europeans as a source for EAINC
division, but I doubt its importance and look rather to the
basic social divisions within the Asian group.
^^A good description and analysis of this struggle
is found in Rosberg and Nottingham's The Myth of Mau Mau.
The term Mau Mau is of uncertain and disputed origin.
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discontent centered especially on the European settler land
acquisition and on economic and social restrictions which
impeded African development»
The animosity was not limited to one tribe, but
among Kikuyus resentment ran deepest and it was within
this tribe that organized opposition to European rule
developed.
It would be difficult to overestimate a peasant
African's feeling for his shamba (farm or land).

This

attachment, which goes beyond economics to include emotion,
is well expressed by Jomo Kenyatta in his anthropological
study of the Kikuyu tribe:
. . . t o a n y o n e w h o w a n t s t o u n d e r s t a n d G i k u y u39
problems, nothing is more important than a correct
grasp of the question of land tenure. For it is
the key to the peoples' life; it secures for them
that peaceful tillage of the soil which supplies
their material needs and enables them to perform
their magic and traditional ceremonies in undis
turbed serenity, facing Mount Kenya.40
It was the Kikuyu especially who felt that many of the
European farms were set illegally on their ancestral land.
And it was the Kikuyu who gradually and increasingly began
to demand the return of this land.
In addition to the question of land, Africans began
39The spelling of Kikuyu with a "G" (Gikuyu) is a
local variation.
40jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal
Life of the Gikuyu (New York: Vintage Books, 1962),
p o XXi.
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to develop an awareness that they were being blocked by
Europeans from fulfilling new and rising expectations in
life.

The sociologist, St. Clair Drake, offers these

examples of "new rights" which Kenya's Africans began to
demand,
1, Buying small items of consumption goods,
2,

Providing education for the children,

3, Occupying new status which has been created
in an expanding social structure.
4,

Earning money.

5,

Going into business,

6, Buying and selling land,^^
Tom Mboya analyzed the African feelings in writing
that

, Mau Mau was the child of economic and social

problems which had accumulated over the years and which had
not found any solution through constitutional channels,
The fact that most of the organized African opposi
tion and virtually all of the Mau Mau rebellion itself was
confined to the Kikuyu tribe was to have lasting signifi
cance.

The reasons behind the confinement are twofold,
1,

The Kikuyu felt most deeply the loss of

traditional land,
^^Drake, pp, 167-160.
^^Mboya, p, 40,
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2,

As the most progressively oriented tribe in

Kenya, they were most bitter about economic and social
restrictions «
The other Africans held a rather ambivalent feeling
about Mau Mau.^^

Doubtless there was sympathy for the

guerrillas as champions of the African cause. But there
was jealousy, too, over the state of Kikuyu progress.

The

government restrictions which were placed on the Kikuyu
during the fight opened up new opportunities for other
Africanso

As a result of African ambivalence, the Colonial

Government was easily able to recruit and deploy African
troops against the Mau Mau,
Systematic opposition to European rule in Kenya
began with tjie formation in 1922 of the East African Associ
ation (EAA), directed by a Kikuyu government clerk named
Harry Thuku,

Thuku was arrested and exiled in 1922 and the

EAA was followed by a second organization of protest in
1923 called the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA),
The KCA dispatched Johnstone (later Jomo) Kenyatta
to London in 1928 to act as a lobbyist for African interests.
It wasn't until 1946 that Kenyatta returned permanently to
Kenya to take up the leadership of the African cause and
eventually the reins of government,
43See Philip Mason, "The Plural Society of Kenya,"
in Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism in Intertropical Communi
ties (Brussels: INCIDI, 1957), p. 328,
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From its formation in 1923 to its official banning
in 1940, the KCA pursued a two-pronged strategy.

There

was an effort, first, to win over Kikuyu elders, Christians
and partially educated youth.

An attempt was made,

secondly, to establish contact with dissidents in the
remaining tribes,

African unhappiness was increasingly

demonstrated in anti-European religious movements and antimissionary African schools.
Military service during World War I led to crosstribal and cross-national contacts for African soldiers,
and the resulting socio-political sophistication probably
contributed to the anti-European organizations of the
1920'S.

Similarly, after World War II a new association

quickly arose to replace the prohibited KCA,

Known as the

Kenya Africa Union (KAU), this organization was headed by
Jomo Kenyatta after his return to Kenya.
for reforms beneficial to Africans.

The KAU pressed

Frustration in this

attempt brought on in 1952 the Mau Mau uprising, the im
prisonment of Kenyatta and other African leaders, and a
declaration of a State of Emergency by Kenya Governor
Sir Evelyn Baring.
The specific incident which prompted Baring's
declaration was the October 7, 1952, murder of Kikuyu
^^These African educational institutions were
confined mainly to the Kikuyu tribe.
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Senior Chief Waruhiu by unknown assassinsThe Governor
then announced on October 20, that "a public emergency has
arisen which makes it necessary to confer special powers
on the Government and its officers for the purpose of main
taining law and order.But the declaration had just the
opposite effect, and both sides mounted a campaign of ter
ror which was to last for some four years.
In addition to the imprisonment of Kenyatta and
other KAU leaders, the government program consisted of the
following measures;
1o

The deployment of European and African armed

2.

A siege of the Kikuyu area of Kenya.

3.

A reinstitution of "tribal discipline" with

forces.

an emphasis on the authority of tribal chiefs and subchiefs»
4.

A system of photographs used in identification

5.

The call for British troops and British General

checks »

Sir George Erskine to lead government forces.
6o

The use of "cleansing oaths" to remove anti-

European oaths taken at a government estimate by 90% of
the Kikuyu tribe.
45under the system of Indirect Rule, chiefs were
government officers.
^^Quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, p. 277°
^^See Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 277-319»
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An analysis of statistics from several sources^^
shows the bloody cost of the conflict.

To the end of 1956

there were;
Rebel Losses
11,503 Kikuyu killed
1 ,035 Captured wounded
1,550 Captured unwounded
26,625 Arrested

2,714 Surrendered
Civilian and Government Casualties
95 Europeans killed (about 65^ of whom were
police or military personnel)
127 Europeans wounded
29 Asians killed
48 Asians wounded
1,920 Africans killed (about 25^ of whom were
police or military personnel)
The deployment of British troops during the Emergency
was to have a profound effect upon the course of Kenyan
politics, for power passed effectively from the European
group to the British Governmento

As George Bennett writes,

the "Imperial Factor" returned then, and decisions were more
^%osberg and Nottingham, p. 303; Mason, p. 32#;
and Delf, p. 39»
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and more made in London*
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These decisions centered around

a rapid but late series of reforms, the purpose of which
was to create undivided loyalty among Africans not actually
participating in the uprising.
In June 1955> African political associations were
allowed at the district level and under the Lyttleton (1954)
and Lennox-Boyd (195Ô) constitutions African influence was
increased within a multiracial concept of government,
African politicians, however, followed the leadership of the
then young Luo trade unionist, Tom Mboya, in pressing for
more radical demands.

Six of the eight African members

elected to the Legislative Council by the first direct
African elections in March 1957, opposed the idea of multi
racial government and demanded majority rule instead.

In

June 195#; Mr. Oginga Odinga shocked the Europeans by asking
in the Legislative Council that Jomo Kenyatta be released
to assume political leadership for Africans.
With an increasing prospect for independence, the
African racial group began to split along tribal lines and
the smaller tribes, fearful of a Kikuyu-Luo hegemony, formed
in 1969, a political party known as the Kenya African Demo
cratic Union (KADU). Important KADU leaders were Masinde
Muliro (an Abaluhya), Ronald Ngala (a Mijikenda) and
Daniel arap Moi (a Kalenjin).
^^Bennett, Kenya:

The opposition party, Kenya

A Political History, p. 134»

48

African Nationalist Union (KANU) was headed by James Gichuru
(a Kikuyu) and the Luos, Mboya and Odinga.
Elections which were held in 1961 gave KANU over
two-thirds of the vote, but KANU party chief Mboya refused
to form a government except under Kenyatta's leadership.
The Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, fearful of Jomo Kenyatta
as the leader of "'darkness and death," then attempted to
help KADU (which had received less than one-fifth of the
vote) to govern the country.

This attempt lasted for two

years until Kenyatta, who was released in 1961, led KANU
to an African majority government in June 1963, and to inde
pendence from Britain on December 12, 1963»
Throughout the decade of African-European conflict
leading to independence, the Asians played a very minor
role.

Only in I960 was any organized effort made by Asians

in support of majority rule based on a common role with
"open" rather than "communal" (racially assigned) legisla
tive seats.

The organization formed in I960 (called Kenya

Freedom Party)was, however, clearly the political expres
sion of but a minority of the Asian group.
^^The Kenya Freedom Party later merged with KANU.
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Kenya Since Independence
Constitutional Organization
The most obvious political fact of post-independent
Kenya is the charismatic strength of President Jomo Kenyatta.
Mzee (the Old Man), as he is called, became Prime Minister
with independence in 1963 and President in 1964 when Kenya
discarded dominion status and became a republic within the
British Commonwealth.

Criticism of the Kenyatta Government

has, until very recently, been directed not at Mzee but
toward other officials or KANU leaders.
The Kenya Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary, but administrative and legislative functions are
joined through the President and his cabinet, all of whom
are members of Parliament.

The President is the leader of

the largest party in Kenya's 17$-member Parliament and
chooses as ministers of his cabinet other Parliamentary
members to head the several departments of administrationo
Two political parties have challenged KANU rule:
KADU, which existed before independence, and Kenya People's
Union (KPU), which was formed in 1966,

KADU disbanded

when its leaders joined KANU on the first anniversary of

^^Recent departures from this mode are described
in Chapter IV below.

50

independence in December 1964»^^

KPU, which was led from

the outset by former Vice President Oginga Odinga was
banned and its leaders arrested in late 1969°
An administrative reorganization in 1966 raised the
number of administrative Provinces from six to seven, but
left the Number of Districts at forty.Each Province and
District has a Nairobi-appointed chief administrative officer
along with staff members from each of the ministries.
Government Policy;
African Socialism
The policies of the Kenyatta Government are framed
in reference to and given direction by a broad ideology
termed African Socialism.

As described in official

speeches and publications, African Socialism includes as its
main features;
1„

Political democracy.

2„

Mutual social responsibility.^^

3.

Various forms of ownership.

52of the three prominent KADU leaders mentioned
previously, Masinde Muliro is now Chairman of the Kenya
Maize Marketing Board (and a member of Parliament), Ronald
Ngala is Minister for Cooperatives and Social Services,
and Daniel arap Moi is Kenya's Vice President.
^^See the map in Appendix B.
5^By "mutual social responsibility" the Government
means a spirit of common duty shared by all Kenyans to
care for the general welfare. This idea is most often
expressed in the official slogan of the Kenyatta Govern
ment--"Ha^ambee" or "Let's all pull together."
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4»

A range of controls to ensure that property is

used in the mutual interests of society and its members.
5o

Diffusion of ownership to avoid concentration

of economic power,
60

Progressive taxes to ensure an equitable dis

tribution of wealth and income.
7.

Central planning and direction.

The twin themes continuously stressed by the
Kenyatta Government are economic development with just or
fair distribution.

Thus the KANU Manifesto published in

November 1969» states:
The fundamental objective of Kanu Government
is to achieve independence for Kenya. We shall
therefore strive to attain the fastest rate of
economic growth and to secure a just distribution
of the national income, both between different
areas of the country and between individuals.56
The same objectives are found in the opening sentence of
African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya:
"With independence, Kenya intends to mobilize its resources
to attain a rapid rate of economic growth for the benefit
of its people.
55See Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!: The Prime Minister
of Kenya's Speeches 1963-1964 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1964); also African Socialism and Its Application to
Planning in Kenya (Nairobi; Government Printer, 1965),
especially p. 16.
^^Published in the East African Standard,
November 19, 1969» p. 3,
^^African Socialism, p. 1.

52

In addition to setting broad goals, the KANU Mani
festo of 1969 lists central yet specific policy objectives
of the Kenyatta Government.

These are:

I0

Government control of developmental finances.

2o

Free medical care for all.

3. Seven years' free education.
4.

Land consolidation, increased agricultural

output and resettlement of landless Africans.
5.

Self-sufficiency in food supplies.
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Provision for "fresh clean" water for humans

and livestock.

7. Mineral prospecting.
8.

Development of internal communications,

9.

Kenyanization of ownership and management of

commerce and industry.
10.

Africanization of the Civil Service.

11.

Social Security benefits and minimum wages for

laborers.
12.

Maintenance of strong armed forces.

13»

Promotion of ties with Uganda and Tanzania.

14.

Greater African economic and political inte

gration throughout the continent.
15 «

"Positive non-alignment" in foreign policy

5^East African Standard, November 19, 1969,
pp. 3-5»
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Problems in the Policy of
Equitable Distribution
An evaluation of progress made by the Kenyatta
Government in achieving the twin goals of economic develop
ment and equitable distribution shows that while develop
ment has advanced fairly rapidly since independence, dis
co

tribution has lagged behind.

Equitable distribution is seen by the Kenya Govern
ment as the means to prevent the emergence of a social class
system.

Thus an official publication states that:

The sharp class divisions that once existed in
Europe have no place in African Socialism and no
parallel in African society. No class problem arose
in the traditional African society and none exists
today among Africans. The class problem in Africa,
therefore, is largely one of prevention, in
particular-(i) to eliminate the risk of foreign economic
domination; and
(ii) to plan development so as to prevent the
emergence of antagonistic classes."^
But the fact that economic divisions which give
rise to class distinctions are growing in Kenya is readily
^^Discussions of Kenya's post-independence economic
growth can be found in: Kaplan _et al.; The New York Times*
January 31, 1966, p. 62; and "Business Makes a Kenya
Safari," Business Week, No. 19&3 (September 2, 1967),
p. 10#. Comparative national industrial production figures
can be found in U.N., Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, United Nations Statistical Yearbook (1968)
(New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations, 1968),
p. 155» For an informative book on the basis of the Kenyan
economy see A. M. O'Connor, An Economic Geography of East
Africa (New York: Frederick A» Praeger Publishers, 1966).
^^African Socialism, p. 12,

54

apparent.

This author remembers remarking to an African

farm laborer, Mr. Arap Tari, that because of limited
nutrition most Africans were rather slender, but that a
few Africans stood out from the norm by their obesity.
Arap Tari replied that these few were clearly either
government officials or businessmen.

The explanation, he

said, was Wananyonya (they are suckling).
Opposition leader Oginga Odinga and his KPU have
used the failure of equitable distribution as the main
attack on KANU.^^

Reflecting in 196? on post-Uhuru Kenya,

Odinga commented:
Their ^the KANU politicians^? interpretation of
independence and African Socialism is that they
should move into the jobs and privileges previously
held by the settlers. If Kenya started uhuru without
an African elite class she is now rapidly acquiring
one. Ministers and top civil servants compete with
one another to buy more farms, acquire more director
ships and own bigger cars and grander houses.o2
And again he remarks;
In six months an M.P. receives more money than
the average peasant earns in half a life time."3
This salary scale reflects nothing like the true
Odinga's autobiography Not Yet Uhuru presents his
personal history and philosophy and a history of KPU.
^^Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru; An Autobiography
(New York; Hill and Wang"^ 1967), p. 302.
^^Annual salaries for M.P.'s have risen from a flat
E620 (about $1770) to CI 200 ($3430) plus daily sitting
allowance, mileage and other allowances. The salary for
Junior Ministers is 112260 ($6460) and for the President
El 5,000 ($42,860) tax-free.
The author's experience with farm laborers puts
their average annual salary at about $150.
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economic standards in the country, and can only
encourage the emergence of a governing group that
is almost as remote from the mass of the people as
were the former colonial administrators.
Finally, Odinga concludes:
Many have begun to use their positions in
politics to entrench themselves as a propertied
economic group, A self-entrenched class of
politician-businessmen is growing up in the cities,
and in the countryside a large land owning class«"5
The obviously political statements made by former
Vice President Odinga might be questioned to some degree,
but other critics, both foreign and domestic, say the same
thing.

Thus the American University publication, Area

Handbook for Kenya, states:
Among Africans, an elite has emerged which
exercises power and enjoys a level of living sub
stantially different from that of the rural
African, the ordinary wageworkers, and the fairly
large number of unemployed characteristic of the
country in the middle 1960's.^"
In Kenya itself, a revealing report was published
in i960 of a study made under the auspices of the National
Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK).

Among other things,

this report entitled Who Controls Industry in Kenya comments
on the previously mentioned Government plans to eliminate
the "risk of foreign economic domination" and to ^prevent
^^Odinga, pp. 302-303»
65lbid., p. 303.
^^Kaplan _et

, p. l62.
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the emergence of antagonistic classes
Addressing itself to the first point of these plans,
the study reveals that of the top fifty directors of private
business concerns in Kenya (i.e« those men having the most
directorships) only seven are Kenyans, and of the seven only
6Ô
four are Africans.
What the working party that made the study feared,
in fact, was that in the Kenyatta Government's all-out
attempt to bring about development, too little attention was
being paid to distribution.

The study quotes a former

Research Fellow at University College, Nairobi, Mr. Peter
Morris, as writing: "A purely economic logic of national
growth would probably lead, in a decade or so, to the con
solidation of a professional, managerial and political
elite."^9

Morris goes on to predict that without special
efforts at dispersing Kenya's wealth the country will find
large slum areas developing around the cities.

These

impoverished areas would, Morris believes, necessitate
heavy-handed punitive efforts by government to control
^^See p. 54 above.
National Cristian Council of Kenya, Department of
Christian Education and Training, Who Controls Industry in
Kenya (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968),
p. 257o This work will hereafter be referred to as WCIIK.
^%CIIK, p. 261.
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restive and crime-prone unemployed residents.

For the

rural areas Morris foresees the possibility of a growing
"marginal landless" labor group in what are apparently
prosperous areas and hard and increasing poverty in the
less-developed regions of the country.

He concludes

that: "The national economy will be making encouraging
progress; but the nation will be falling apart.
Another commentator, Mr. A. 0. Menya, is quoted
from a speech he gave at an NCCK Conference in 1966 as
saying:
There is a clear class division in Kenya's
society which is based largely on the share of eco
nomic wealth of the nation. Kenya's society pro
vides a very good example of the haves and havenots. . . . Kenya's economy is growing very rapidly,
but the gap between classes or between the haves
and have-nots seems to be widening. There is clear
evidence of a few African political and bureaucratic
çlite who are slowly merging with the commercial
elite to form an apex at the top of the socio
political and economic elite, while the majority of
Africans linger helplessly below the totem pole.
This trend may defeat the very tenet of African
socialism which in effect may lead to another
revolution of an unanticipated nature and which
may end up in the disintegration of the whole
Kenya society.71
A paragraph from the study summarizes this deep problem for
Kenya:
Perhaps two points are most crucial: First,
we must recognize that development inevitably
7Qlbid., p. 262.
71lbid., p. 259.
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brings inequalities; it is bound to increase
social tensions, to widen gaps, to reward some
more than others. Secondly, we may ask whether
more needs to be done to share the fruits of
development, to increase the social cohesion of
the nation, and to prevent an undue portion of
power being concentrated in too few hands.72
Summary
This chapter contained an attempt to analyze
Kenya's modern history by concentrating on the relation
ships of the primordial groups.

The analysis is not com

plete, however, for there remains the task of investi
gating current primordial group relations»

As an intro

duction to this investigation, the last section of this
chapter (entitled Kenya Since Independence) provided an
account of recent events.

We are now able, therefore, to

proceed with the next two chapters, both of which deal
with current primordial group relations in Kenya.
72rbid.

CHAPTER III
THE CONTEMPORARY ASIAN-AFRICAN
RELATIONSHIP
One result of Kenyan independence was a sharp
decline in the power of the European racial group.

This

decline of European strength allows the description of
primordial group relations since independence to concen
trate on the Asians and Africans,

Chapter III takes up

the important African-Asian racial group relationship.
The chapter contains, first, a discussion of the attitudes
and actions of each group toward the other.

Also included

in this chapter is an account of recent economic pressures
put on the Asians by the Kenyatta Government,

The

chapter concludes with a summation of possible recourses
for Asians in the face of this official pressure.
Background to the Relationship;
A Question ëf Gitizenship
Some Asians had, before independence, balked at the
idea of African rule; a few others chose the opposite
direction, formed the Kenya Freedom Party and supported
uhuru,

Most, however, remained passive and failed to take
59
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any action at all.

But with independence came a necessary

test of Asian attitudes in the form of choice of citizen
ship o
Incoming African leaders and outgoing colonialists
devised a system whereby automatic Kenyan citizenship was
granted to any Asian born in Kenya who had at least one
parent who was also born in Kenya and who (the parent) was
at the date of independence a British citizen or British1
protected person.
A two-year grace period beginning at
independence was allowed for all remaining Asians to regis
ter for Kenyan citizenship.

No dual citizenship was

allowed; but for those Asians not choosing Kenyan citizenship
the alternative of a British passport was offered.
No official Kenya Government figures have been
published on the exact numbers of Asians in the different
categories.

The statistics offered by Noel Mostern in

Reporter magazine and shown in Table 4 are probably, how
ever, fairly accurate.

The statistics in Table 4 are com

plicated, however, by the fact that many Asians who were
granted automatic Kenyan citizenship could have a parent who
chose to obtain or retain British citizenship.

These Kenyan

citizens could not then be regarded as truly permanent
citizens.
^Yash Ghai, "The Future Prospects," in Portrait of
a Minority? Asians in East Africa, ed. Dharam P. Ghai
(Nairobi? Oxford University Press, 196$), P» 136.
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TABLE 4
FIGURES ON ASIAN CITIZENSHIP^
Automatic Kenyan Citizens

60,000

Applications for
Kenyan Citizenship 1963-65
(Applications processed by
the Kenyan Government)

20,000

Balance, i.e» British, Pakistani
or Indian Citizenship

(13,000)
100,000-120,000

Total Asians in Kenya at Independence (approx„)

190,000

^From Noel Mostert, "Slamming the Door on Kenya's
Asians," Reporter, XXXVIII (April 4, I960), 27.
^Most sources place the number of Asians in Kenya
holding British passports at somewhere near the 120,000
figure» See, for example, Africa Report, XIII, No, 4
(April 1968), 22; and The New York Times, January 7, 1969,
p„ 3» At least one estimate, however, was as high as
150,000» See Newsweek, September 25, 1967, p. 55»
The Asian group has been frightened since indepen
dence by the avowed policy of the African government to
change the political, economic and social structure of
Kenya.

The Kenyatta Government has been significantly

ambivalent in terming this policy both "Kenyanization
i.e. the process of putting Kenyan citizens into positions
of importance, and "Africanization," i.e. the replacement
of Europeans and Asians regardless of their citizenship
with Africans.2
^For a detailed discussion of this policy see
pp. 68-72 below.
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The uncertainty of this policy has caused Asians
to fear a loss or limitation of occupational possibilities
in Kenya,

Thus, within one month after Uhuru, 1,400 Asians

left civil service posts and the country;^ and the average
annual rate of departure from 1963 to 1968 was about 7,000
AsiansDuring 1967, however, the Kenyan Parliament
passed two acts which stimulated a massive outflux of
Asians during the early part of 1968»

Both measures were

major steps by the Kenyan Government to Kenyanize the
c
private sector of the economy,^
The first measure, known as the Immigration Act,
authorized the Ministry of Labour to establish a Kenyanization of Personnel Bureau, the duty of which is to study
the position of non-citizens in commerce and industry»
All non-citizens were required by this act to apply for
new work permits.

The government acknowledged that the

intent of the Immigration Act was to eventually permit only
those non-citizens essential for the economy to remain in
the country»
The second legislative step, known as the Trade
License Act, required that all trading activity in Kenya be
^The New York Times, January 24? 1964, p» 2»
%ew Republic, March 16, 1968, p» 8»
^Discussions of the acts can be found in Mostert,
p, 27, and WCIIK, p» 257.
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analyzedo

The government was authorized, on the basis of

this analysis, to decide whether having a non-citizen
trader in a specific area of Kenya was of benefit to the
country or not.

Certain regions, known as General Trading

Areas, were to be set aside for both citizen and noncitizen trade activity.

Other regions (which will probably

be enlarged in the future) were to be established for Kenyan
citizen traders only.
During the early days of 1968, about 20,000 Asians
left Kenya to enter Great Britain.

The exodus resulted

partly from fears generated by the economic restrictions
placed on Asians by the Kenyan Government.

But there was

Asian apprehension, too, that Britain would soon shut off
the influx of Asian immigrants.

The apprehension became

fact when on February 27, 1968, a combination of Labourites
and Conservatives^ voted in the face of charges of a com
promise of British good faith and a broken solemn promise,
to pass the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill.
This bill restricts Asian immigration into Britain
from Kenya to a yearly maximum of 1,500 family heads and
their dependents.

The lopsided margin of passage (372 to

62 with 180 abstentions) reflects the fears of many British
whites over a growing "coloured population" which stands at
^Parliamentary opposition was led by the Liberal
Party.
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about 2% of the total British population*^
The large majority of non-citizen Asians in Kenya
were thus effectively cut off from entry into Britain by
this acts

Other possible countries of resettlement were,

moreover, closed at the same time.

Both India and Pakis

tan, the countries of origin for the Asians, and Uganda, a
neighboring African country with a significant Asian
minority, refused responsibility for resettling the Asians
who wished to leave Kenya,

India and Pakistan, in addition,

passed restrictive immigration legislation to coincide with
the British policy.
These actions by the Indian and Pakistani Govern
ments may appear surprising, but both countries have con
sistently maintained that the question of citizenship for
Asians in all of East Africa was a British problem»^

The

reluctance of these countries to accept responsibility for
Asians in Kenya may stem from fears of setting a precedent
for Asians in other countries such as Fiji, Mauritius and
10
Ceylon,
In India's case, for example, the number of
7"News in Brief: Kenya," African Report, XIII,
No, 4 (April 1968), 22-23,
%ee Mostert, pp„ 27-28,
^For a discussion of this policy see Anirudha Gupta,
"Indians Abroad--in Asia and Africa: The Problem," Africa
Quarterly, VII (January-March 1968).
^^See the London Times, February 26, 1968, p. 8,
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people in Kenya who can trace their ancestry back to India
amounts to only about 3^ of the total figure of Indians
living abroad.
Attitudinal Determinants
African Attitudes About Asians
One example of the lack of social scientific data
on East Africa is in the scarcity of attitudinal surveyso
Jo Eo Goldthorpe, however, made a survey in 1955 of the
attitudes of 52 African graduates of Makerere College in
Kampala J Uganda, which covered among other things the views
12

of these men toward Asians.

Included in the sample group

were 9 Kenyans, 41 Ugandans and 5 Tanzanians.

The sample

could not, for very obvious reasons, be called representa=
tive for the whole Kenyan African population, but the
results are rather revealing indicators of African attitudes.
Of the 46 graduates who expressed a definite view
on Asians, only 2 were termed "friendly," 19 of the answers
were "tolerant or ambivalent" and 25, or 54%, showed
"hostility,"

Common opinions were that Asians as super-

visors in government service were uniformly bad ("sarcasticj
nagging and demanding"), Asians as traders were regarded as
11See Kondapi, pp. 527-528.
I^The graduating date for the sample group was the
mid-1930's. See J. E. Goldthorpe, "An African Elite," The
British Journal of Sociology, VI, No. 1 (March 1955)«
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selfish and dishonest, and Asians as progenitors were seen
as too prolifico

On the positive side there was respect

for Asian skill and industry, and some agreement that
younger Asians were less race conscious than their elders
and more likely to make informal social contact»
Goldthorpe writes:
Indians /J-OBO Asian_s7 were frequently compared
with Europeans, the feelings being apparently that
while some Europeans are in Africa for the benefit
of Africans all the Indians are there for their own
ends. "Their coming into the country was treacherous"
said one member of the sample.'3
The author's experience in Kenya would tend to
confirm a general African dislike for Asians*

In express

ing antipathy, the Africans offer both social and economic
explanations for their attitude.

Africans, first, are

suspicious and resentful over the independent social and
cultural life of Asians.

Informal contacts between the two

groups are generally restricted to the elites who meet at
bars.

Tom Mboya scornfully labeled this type of contact
"cocktail integration."'1 h' Otherwise, the typical AfricanAsian relationship is buyer-seller or often servant-master.
^GoldthorpeJ, "An African Elite," p. 46.
^^Mboya, p. 109° Mboya also made a remark in 1962
about the rightful place of intermarriage in an integrated
society. This caused widespread indignation throughout the
Asian group. One Asian leader wrote to the East African
Standard that: "Shahs will not give their daughters to
Patels, and they will not give them to Africans," This
quotation reveals both racial and caste-sect Asian grouping.
Quoted in Delf, p. 5»
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Educated or semi-educated Africans 1 5 see the Europeans as
a source of Kenya's progress, while Asians are viewed as
foreign competitors.
Communications between Asians and the vast majority
of Africans are further limited by the fact that both
groups must speak kiSwahili, which is a second language for
each.

Asians have, moreover, adopted a habit similar to

that of the Europeans in utilizing an ungrammatical pidgin
version of kiSwahili»

The imprecise use of this indigenous

language strikes many Africans as condescending.

In two

years of living in Kenya, the only non-Africans the author
heard using the Swahili term Bwana (Mr. or Sir) with
genuine respect when addressing Africans were American and
other foreign volunteers»
Asians hold a comparatively and conspicuously rich
position in Kenya, but this position is not now beyond the
expectations of many Africans»

Africans feel, moreover,

that Asians have restricted the chances for upward mobility
by refusing to open their businesses to African partici
pation.

There is also a widespread feeling, finally, that

Asians have been bleeding Kenya by exporting capital to
I^The term "educated" is used here in reference to
a formal or Western-type education.
^^See Delf, pp. 63-71.
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friends and relatives in India and

Pakistan.

Asian Attitudes About Africans
The Asian view of Africans is more difficult to
assess than the reverse African attitude»

The colonial

racial hierarchy put Asians a step above Africans^ and the
continued habit of that position is evidenced in a common
Asian rudeness when dealing with Africans»

The author had

the interesting experience of meeting and conversing with
several Asians in Kenya who assumed by the common relative
lightness of skins an entente in "enduring" the Africans.
But the Asians realize that they are living in an
African country now, and they are apprehensive and uncertain
about what steps the government will take to rectify the
inequities of colonialism and bring about a new social and
economic order.

They wonder if it will be a policy of

Kenyanization, Which will develop new opportunities for
Kenyan citizens, or Africanization, with a new order based
on race.

They recognize, finally, that the Kenyatta

Government is being forced between the pressures of needed
Asian skills on the one side and African political pressure
on the other.
17while there is no hard data on this point, authors
such as Morris (The Indians in Uganda, pp. 134-135) and
Tandon (p. 122) have discounted any real or significant
losses to East Africa by Asians removing capital from this
area.
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The cross-pressures are seen in official pronounce
ments such as that of the East African Udoji Commission of
1963»^^

The Commission listed the following reasons for

Africanization of the civil service in Kenya, Uganda and
Tanzania;
1, For historical reasons; the African Racial
Group was accorded discriminatory treatment during the
colonial period,
2„

For political considerations; the hiring of

expatriates''^ is embarrassing.
3»

For functional reasons; an indigenous staff is

more permanent,
4o

For economic reasons; the expatriates are

expensive,
5,

For social and long-term motivations; expatriates

leave with their experience.
Of these five reasons, only the first applies to
Asians, and even here the Asians maintain that they, too,
suffered somewhat in the imbalance of colonialism.
Commission goes on to assert, however, that:

The

"Africani

zation is not merely a policy of equalization, it is also
^^Report of the Africanization Commission for the
East African Common Services Organization, quoted in Yash
Ghai, p, 153o
^^Expatriates are foreigners, usually whites,
working in Africa.
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that all key and policy-advising posts in the Civil Service
should be held by Africans
Statements by Kenyan Government officials are rather
ambiguouso

Often the term "Africanization" is used but then

qualified.

The following examples are from speeches by

President Kenyatta.^^
In a House of Representatives speech of July 23»
1963s he stated:
It is the policy of the Government to Africanize
the Civil Service as quickly as we can» But at the
same time, what we need to remember is not the colour
of a person's skin, nor anyone's race. We want
experienced people. Some of these people—-whom ray
friends regard as imperialists or colonialists-—have
experience which we need. Until we train our people
to hold these posts, we cannot—in a day, as soon as
we achieve Independence—scrap every post and say we
will put black men in them because they are black.
In my Government, I want experience, and I do not
care where I get it. Unless we have a Government
with capable Officers to run it, then our Government
will fall. I want the people to understand this:
that we have this policy of Africanization, that
people are being trained for various posts, and that
when they are ready we shall give them responsibility.
But we cannot take people just because they are
blacko^Z
This speech indicates that the Kenyatta Government
intends to follow a policy of Africanization as soon as
Africans are capable of assuming responsible positions.
20page 11 of the Report, quoted in Yash Ghai, p. 140.
^Ipor a collection of speeches made by Mr. Kenyatta
during 1963 and 1964 see Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!.
^^Kenyatta, Harambee!, p. 110.
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Yet in the same month, July 1963, Kenyatta spoke in
a somewhat different vein before a group of Asian business
men in Mombasa.
The Gbverhment . , <> is for every citizen of
Kenya, Irrespective of what race or religion you
belong to, we will work for you all» » . o We want
to retain your skills and business experience, and
wish you to continue to work as you have done in
the Colonial days.23
In spite of this benign pose, the President has on
occasion had tough words for Asians.

Thus in a Nairobi

speech of June 1964 he warned;
Indians
e. Asians/ must learn as well, and
must adapt themselves to live with our people.
They must obey the African rule.
I say that if there are any Asians who are
unwilling to work with us, they can pack their bags
and go.24
And at his residence at Githunguri in September of
1964 Kenyatta said:
Speaking as the leader of my Party, I would like
to pose this question: when we were fighting for free
dom and human dignity, how many non-Africans died in
this struggle? The non-Africans must abandon their
old strategy. They must realize this was consigned
to the flames, with all other vestiges of imperialism,
on Independence Day. We do not want such people to
change their colour. To them I simply say; turn and
become Africans in your hearts, and we will welcome
you with open arms.25
In what is probably one of the most revealing and
23lbid., pp. 109-110,
24ibid., p. 110.
25lbid., p o 109°
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straightforward statements by an African leader to Asians,
Tom Mboya spoke the following words before the Kenya
Indian Congress in July 1962.
There is no intention to replace present privilege
with African privilege, but a true Kenyan--irrespective
of his race or creed--raust be entitled to some privi
lege in his mother country. In the past the African
has been underprivileged and therefore in the early
stages at least, "localization" is bound to give the
appearance that it is primarily Africanization, and
indeed by force of numbers it is.26
Radical statements advocating Africanization have
been limited thus far to Parliamentary Backbenchers and
labor union spokesmen,2 7 but Kenya's Asians wonder how long
the Kenyatta Government can resist political pressures which
are directly connected with rising African expectations.
Economic Factors Affecting
the Relationship
The Precarious Economic
Position of the Asians
The trend among young Africans in Kenya, as else
where, is a movement away from rural areas and into the
cities.

This generation of Africans thinks of agriculture

as undignified and backward. Freedom and indeed civiliza
tion demand jobs in commerce or, more especially, in public
service.

It is precisely in these commercial and government

^^Mboya, p. 109«
Z^Yash Ghai, p. HO.
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occupations that 60 to IQffo of Asians throughout East Africa
2A
make their living.
The fact that so many Asians are
working in the choice occupations and so many Africans
desire these jobs serves to put the Asians in a difficult
position.

Can a push for total Africanization, they

wonder, be far off?
Goldthorpe's study of attitudes alluded to an
African unhappiness over relative Asian affluence.

Such

Asian affluence does not mean, of course, that every
Asian is rich and all Africans are poor but, rather, that
Asians are generally richer.

This fact is revealed in the

following statistics.
1o

Although they number around 2% of Kenya's

population, the Asians' percentage of the national income
is about 20^.29
2.

The average 1962 cash earnings for Asian males

in Kenya was E551 (about $1575)» which is about seven times
that for Africans.
3.

In 1966J Asians controlled

of Kenya's

^^Dharam P. Ghai, pp. 106-108.
L. Muller, "The Economic Position of the
Asians in Africa," The South African Journal of Economics,
XXXIII, Noo 2 (June 1965), 117.
——
^^Dharam P. Ghai, "An Economic Survey," p. 100.
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wholesale and retail trade,^^
4»

A 1967 estimate places Asian holdings in real

estate, commercial buildings and investments at 75^ of all
urban property
Table 5 shows by race the percentage of taxpayers
in different income brackets for 1962»
TABLE 5
INCOME IN KENYA BY RACE (1962}^

Income Group

Africans

Under El 20^
EI2O-EI59
EI6O- E I 9 9
E200-E399
E4OO and over

91
4.7
1 .7
1 »7
0.5

TOTALS

WOoOfo

Arabs and
Somalis

Asians

Europeans

7.2
1 o9
2.0
2.9

11 oOfo
4o3
3o3
13.0
60.4

1 <.5%
3.2
0.6
2.5
92.2

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

ÛSoOffo

^Gupta, p. 307? from the Development Plan of Kenya
1962-70. Po 34o
= $2.86.

The demonstrated Asian economic success is based
upon what one author has termed their "Quasi-Protestant
^^Henry Reuter, ^You Can't Run a Duka Without
Hundis /sic7«" New York Times, January 31, 1966, p. 62.
32Kaplan _et a^., p. 135°
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Ethic J" which includes a strong commercial sense, a
capacity for work, a low propensity to consume and a passion
for accumulation of capital,^^

Ro C, Thurnwald lists the

following six reasons for Asian prosperity»
1.

They follow a simple life, a kind of "economic

asceticism»"
2o

They have a very close knit family life

arrangement.
3o

They save their money»

4.

There is familial aid among them»

5o

They astutely position themselves on main lines

of commercial traffic.
6o

They have developed abilities in English,

readings writing and mathematics.
Many Europeans and Africans alike have degraded or
ignored the contribution made by Asians to the development
of the Kenya economy.

But the opening up of a monetary

economy in several sections of the country and the avail
ability of skilled manpower and capital necessary for eco
nomic expansion have resulted from the Asian presence.
The East Africa Royal Commission Report (Cmd 9475? 1955)
^^Dharam P. Ghai, "An Economic Survey," p. 103»
^^Thurnwald,

p. 2^3o
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clearly enunciated the Asian contributiono

35

The growth of modern commerce in East Africa has
been almost entirely due to the activities of nonAfrican members of the population and in particular
to the Indian
e. Asian/, Arab and Goan traders and
to the large European firms with their trade connexions
in the western world» Indeed, the remarkable tenacity
and courage of the Indian trader has been mainly
responsible for stimulating the wants of the indigenous
peoples even in the remotest areas, by opening them to
a shop window on the modern world and for collecting
for sale whatever small surpluses are available for
disposalo
And again:
A new and emergent people cannot, in a short
period acquire the technical skills and organizing
capacity which other older people have acquired only
after long periods of tradition and experience» » o o
The knowledge and experience which suitable immi
grants can bring to East Africa are assets with which
it is impossible to disperse with in any foreseeable
future.
Estimates made in 1962 on skilled manpower in East
Africa show about iSjOOO professional men of graduate or
equivalent level, senior administrators and senior managers
in industry and commerce.
for 40^.

Of this totalj Asians account

A second estimate on technicians and sub-

professional grades, executive grades in civil service,
middle management in industry and commerce, and teachers
with secondary education but not degrees puts their
number at about 49,500 men of which Asians make up
35Quoted in Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African
, p o 112.
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These figures would support the argument that the
Asians are needed in Kenya»

It is equally apparent that

their presence tends to develop new economic opportunities,
for the Asians lend aid both in the contribution of man
power needed for development and in the example they set
of successful business methods.

Yet pressures against the

Asian group have continued to mount since independence»
Some authors are optimistic that given economic
growth the pressures will subside. Thus Bert F. HoselitZj,
writing about all immigrant minorities in newly independent
nations, comments?
. . . as these countries achieve political inde
pendence and take moderately successful steps
toward modernizationj, economic growth will improve
the social and economic position of the indigenous
people. More than any other factor, this tends to
make possible the integration of foreign ethnic
minorities into the social structure of newly
developing countries. Some phases of the integra
tion of ethnic minorities may be complex and diffi
cult, however, leading to violence or other forms of
social conflict. But in the long run ethnic "dualism"
will disappear as a structurally more simplified and
^ The two categories of skilled manpower and the
population estimates come from Guy Hunter, The New Societies
of Tropical Africa (London; Oxford University Press, 1962),
and are quoted in Dharam P. Ghai, "An Economic Survey,"
p. 102. While figures for Kenya per se are not available,
the Asian percentage of skilled manpower is probably much
higher for that country alone than the figure for all of
East Africa. Approximately one-half of all the Asians in
East Africa reside in Kenya. The total population for East
Africa in 1962 was about 24,500,000. This puts the combined
skilled manpower figures at .28% of the total.
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better integrated society emerges
Social and economic facts^ in Kenya at least, do
not support Mr. Hoselitz' optimism, however»

Granted,

much does depend on the growth of Kenya's economy, and the
record thus far is good.
factors are involved*

But two other equally important

First, economic growth does not

necessarily mean equitable distribution of the fruit of
that growth.

Many observers are highly critical of Kenya's
3S
lack of progress is achieving a just distribution.
Second, the process of economic growth and development is
intricately coupled with a parallel process of rising eco
nomic and social expectations.^^

As the idea for economic

advancement is pushed in Kenya, many Africans--some for the
first time--become aware of their own relative poverty.
One direct result of this new and profound sense of poverty
is friction between poorer Kenyans and richer outside
national groups, and between poor Africans in Kenya and
richer internal social groups--both Asians and Africans.
^^Bert F. Hoselitz, "Interaction Between Industrial
and Pre-Industrial Stratification Systems," in Social
Structure and Mobility in Economic Development,, ed. Neil J.
Smelser and Seymour Martin Lipset (Chicago: Aldine, 1966),
p. 191.
^^See pp. 53-5# above.
^^This idea will be more fully amplified in rela
tion to the stresses which it places on tribal relations.
See pp. 101-106 below.

79

The Asian Economic Response
The Asian response to hostile African attitudes and
increased governmental restrictions on Asian economic
activity is, as has been mentioned, one of ambivalence.,
Asians are caught between an emotional attachment to Kenya
as their home and a rational assessment of their position
as a small immigrant minority marked by wealth and color in
a newly independent nation seeking to bring about socio
economic change»

The whole thought, moreover, of making a

meaningful economic response to the increased economic
restrictions by opening Asian businesses to a significant
African participation is most disturbingo

The thought works

against natural non-altruistic business inclinations among
the Asianso

Africans are regarded as economic risks, since

most cannot contribute capital 5, experience or skill to any
joint business venture. For small Asian businesses there
is a final added factor in that most of these ventures are
family enterprises, a combined socio-economic activity into
which Africans would not easily or happily fit»
Alternative job opportunities are quite limited.
Asians must seek occupations which Africans find inaccessible
by reason of the necessary qualifications or outright
undesirability.

Agriculture must also be largely excluded

because of an understandable African reluctance to sell land
to non-citizens.

Some Asians are hoping to initiate or
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expand wholesale trade operations

This hope by the very

limitations of the Kenyan economy, however, must be
restricted to a minority of the Asian group.
Educational Complications: The Possibility
for an Educational Response
The quality of Asian education in Kenya has been
adversely affected by several factors. First, colonial
administrators discriminated on a racial basis against both
African and Asian educational programs.

Second, the Asian

caste-sect group division limited the resources that Asians
might contribute to their own educational advancement.

The

financial assets and trained personnel needed to build and
staff schools were not combined in any united Asian effort
to promote high-quality education.
A study made by A. A. Kazimi in 1947 on Asian
education in East Africa^^ revealed these common problems
in the Asian schools:
1. Facilities were severely overcrowded.
2.

Teachers were poorly qualified.

In Kenya, only

one-third of the teachers in government-run schools for
^^See Delf, p. 46; and Hunter, p. 1$6.
^"'Raymond Gold, "The Educational Systems of East
Africa" (unpublished manuscript; Missoula, Montana, 1969).
^^This study is quoted in P. M. Rattansi and
M. Abdulla, "An Educational Survey," in Portrait of a
Minority, ed. Dharam P. Ghai, pp. 117-11°^"!

âi

Asians had degrees or qualifications»

In the private

schools only 54 teachers of a total of 213 were college
matriculates «
3o

Courses were too literary.

Kazimi found too

great an emphasis on the passage of the Cambridge School
Certificate examination and too little emphasis placed on
useful technical education.
4o

There were few opportunities for higher educa

tion.
Under the Colonial Government in Kenya the whole
system of education was racially segregated, including
separate government administrative sections,, syllabusesj
comprehensive examinations and school facilities.
Government expenditures for education for this
period were, moreoverj racially discriminatory.

The 1955

public appropriation for each European student was EÔ5
(about $245.00); for each Asian student E21 (about $60.00)
and for each African student E6 (about $17o00).^^ Under
the Kenya Development Programme of 1957-1960; Europeans
(1% of the population) received 19% of the education budget
funds; Asians (3% of the population) received 28% of the
funds; and Africans (96% of the population) received 53%
of the funds. Such discrimination was compounded by the
43see Gold.
^^Delf, p. 44c
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fact that Asians and Africans were, of course, the two
racial groups least able to counterbalance insufficient
public funding by their own private means.

The Asians tried

to take up the financial slack through caste-sect schools<>
In i960, only one-third of the Asian schools were govern
ment run, while one-third were partially aided and onethird were totally

private.^5

The effect on the quality

of Asian schools by the inadequacy of this approach is
documented in the unhappy conclusions of the Kazimi Reporto
Asians now see some hope in the non-racial and
integrated school system established since Uhuru.

Not only

do they realize that the future quality of Asian-African
relations lies with the Asian youth, but they also desire
to see better relations develop between the youngsters of
both races through contacts in schools.

There are increased

contacts, too, between Asian teachers and African students.
This latter relationship may well impress Africans as a
demonstration of Asian willingness to participate in the
development of an African country where education is highly
prized.
Asians recognize that the key to adjustment to
programs of Africanization lies in developing the abilities
through education to fill Kenya's skilled and professional
manpower requirements.
45ibid.

Ô3

But while Asians hold hopes for social and economic
advantages in the post-independence school system^ they
realize that the government is intent upon reversing the
inequities of colonial educational policies»

This reali

zation causes apprehension among Asians, because there is
uncertainty over what future tack the Kenyan Government will
take toward the education of Asian youngsters.Funds may
be cut, for example, for Asian-run schools which are par
tially supported by public grants. Some Asians feel that
caste-sect schools will need to expand to furnish new oppor
tunities for Asian students and to provide insurance against
possible government discriminationo
The caste-sect groups, however, have only limited
resources to contribute.

The real hope for Asian education

in Kenya and elsewhere lies with the African governments.
P. M. Rattans! and Me Abdulla conclude in their survey of
Asian education in East Africa that:
The control of education is primarily in the
hands of the governments, and in this sense the
future of the Asians is also in the hands of the
governments 0 If the governments adopt policies which
discriminate against the Asian school children and
effectively reduce their opportunities for education,
the future for the Asians will be terribly bleak,47
4&See Rattansi and Abdulla, pp. 125-126.
47lbid,, p. 124. The governments referred to here
are, of course, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda,
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The Problems and Prospects for Asian
Political Participation
o o o if the Asians can integrate effectively at the
political level; then many of their social and eco
nomic problems will be dealt with more sympatheti
cally and successfully.48
This statement by an Asian author demonstrates a
recognition of opportunities flowing from political inte
gration or participation.

But there are both historical

legacies and contemporary difficulties which may prevent
such effective political integration.
The historical contribution of the Asians to the
achievement of Kenya's independence was minimal, and
Africans are aware of this fact. The Asian-European con
flict during the colonial period was for Asians an antiEuropean rather than a pro-African effort.

The restraint

which this conflict put on the Europeans was beneficial,
of course, to the African cause of independence.

But every

one in Kenya knows that most Asians did not have African
interests in mind when they struggled with the Europeans,
George Delf makes the point that Asians were prob
ably surprised by the early achievement of uhuru in Kenya.^9
Such surprise is understandable, for many observers both
inside Kenya and out did not expect Kenya's rapid movement
^%ash Ghai, p, 143.
^^Delf, pp, vii-ix.
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toward self-government during the late 1950's»

50

But

Asian uninvolvement in the promotion of this movement runs
deeper than mere surprise.

The Asians were a relatively

privileged group in the colony and were naturally unwilling
to jeopardize this privilege by supporting rule by the
Africans who, under the colonial system, had not been
allowed to develop or to demonstrate either intellectual or
political leadership,
Asians were hindered, also, in the formation of a
coherent policy with respect to uhuru by their caste-sect
divisions.

This divisiveness, mentioned before in terms

of caste-sect group political activity and the weakness of
51
the EAINC,
has plagued Asian political activity throughout
Kenya's history.
George Bennett and Carl G, Rosberg in their book
52
on the 1961 elections in Kenya
write of the political dis
unity among Asians, a phenomenon they terra "political
communalism."
However much leaders may proclaim that it must
and should end, all Asian elections in Kenya in the
50A s expressed to this author, the typical settler
reaction to the rapid achievement of independence in Kenya
was one of great surprise and a feeling that the British
Government had betrayed European interests there.
See po 14 and pp. 39-40 above,
52G@orge Bennett and Carl G, Rosberg, The Kenvatta
Election: Kenya 1960-1961 (London: Oxford University
tress, 1961),
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past--and this was no exception—have been dominated
by communalism. The first document noticed on many
an Asian candidate's desk, and the first subject of
conversation with the agent of any candidate, was
the breakdown of the voters' role by communities»
Muslim and non-Muslim candidates alike knew that their
first task was to seek and obtain support from the
leaders of the various groups: Patels, Shahs, Punjabi
Hindus, Sikhs, Goans, etc. on the non-Muslim side,
with, on the Muslim, Sunnis, Ismailis, Bohras, Menonsj
Ithnasharis, etco53
All of these factors, then—surprise, fear and
disunity—contributed to Asian inability to assist uhuru.
These factors also help to explain the Asian failure to
follow strong exhortations by Prime Minister Nehru and
other Indian and Pakistani leaders to East African Asians
to support anti-colonialist movements.
The ability of the Asians to participate effectively
in the Kenyan political system since independence has also
been limited by several factors. Emigration has meant a
decline in numbers and political strength; Asians are now
53Bennett and Rosberg, p» 11$.
5^A final possibility for Asian inaction is offered
by Tom Mboya who wrote that he believed the Asian leaders
had "betrayed the interests of their people in not support
ing Uhuru vigorously."' Mboya felt that: "The overwhelming
majority of the Indian
Asian7 community in Kenya sup
ported the African stana and want"id to adhere to the
standards set by Nehru and Gandhi as friends and allies in
the struggle for freedom and democracy" (Mboya, p. 10).
Mboya's belief is difficult to assess in that this author
found nothing to support this position, but rather observed
marked Asian-African differences which would obviously tend
to discount such "overwhelming" Asian sympathy for indepen
dence. Mboya had, however, both the insight and experience
to validate his position.

a?
divided by a new citizen - non-citizen cleavage; and,
finally, African majority rule has limited the range of
political options open to Asians. This limited range of
options results from the fact that aspiring Asian poli
ticians have become more dependent on the support of
African voters and less able to appear to champion Asian
causes.
The Asian dependence on African voters would be
lessened if a one-party system were to develop in Kenya.
Indeed, there may be much hope for Asians in the develop
ment of such a system.

If the Asians were to become a

strong supporting faction in a dominant party, they might
have a much better opportunity to influence government
policies.

Their participation in such a party would prob

ably, moreover, be welcomed.

There is a realization among

top African leaders of the significant Asian contribution
to the Kenyan economy.

This realization is not shared

with the African masses who see Asians as obstacles to their
own economic progress.

In a dominant one-party government

in Kenya, Asian political participation would not be subject
to the approval of the African masses in the role of voters
to such a degree as it is now.
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The Asian-African Conflict;
Functions and Risks
Whether the Kenyatta Government consciously pur
sues the consequences or not, certain sequels, both
functional and risky, have resulted from the governmental
pressures and the maintenance of the Asian-African conflict
as a national issue.

The functional consequences go beyond

the expressed intent of the Government to eliminate colonial
inequities which restricted African socio-economic develop
ment, Desirable consequences (in the Government's view)
from continued Asian-African strife include the following;
1o

A promotion of cross-tribal African group

unity. Sociologist Lewis A, Goser writes;
Conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity
and boundary lines of societies and group.
Conflict with other groups contributes to the
establishment and reaffirmation of the identity of a
group and maintains its boundaries against the sur
rounding social world.55
2,

A safety valve for African frustrations prompted

by limited economic and social gains in the face of rising
expectations.

Asians can easily be made the scapegoats for

the unmet expectations.
3,

An indebtedness to the government by new

African businessmen who have, with official aid, moved into
economic positions formerly held by Asians.
55coser, p, 38,
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The risks entangled in the Asian-African conflict
go beyond the obvious danger of an economic loss if
talented and productive Asians were to move out of Kenya
en masse»

Three risks involved by placing too much pressure

on the Asians includes
1o

Possible violence by Africans against the

2.

A decreased incentive for the Kenyatta Govern

Asians.

ment to fulfill the pledges of African Socialism.

When the

Asians are made economic scapegoats, the focus is taken off
policy failures in, for example, the program of equitable
distribution.
3.

The establishment of a dangerous policy precedent

for heavy-handed government action towards a minority group
in Kenya,

The legacy of colonial rule in Kenya, as in the

remainder of Africa, has been described by Victor C. Ferkiss
as

habituation to centralized, undemocratic political

rule,"5&

If the Kenyatta Government deals harshly with

Asians and, more especially, if the mistreated Asians
include Kenyan citizens, the "habituation" of unrestricted
political rule will be extended and intensified.

If such

a precedent is established, there is little reason to
believe that target of such treatment could not one day be
one of the African tribes,
^^Ferkiss; p. 7â,
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Summary
In this chapter the author has endeavored to
analyze the current Asian-African relationship in Kenya,
Cross-racial attitudes were described, and an account was
given of the increasing political and economic pressures
placed on the Asian group by official actions in Great
Britain, India, Pakistan and Kenya.

The governmental

pressures have generated Asian hopes to respond, and these
hopes were analyzed by describing possible economic,
educational and political adaptations open to the Asians,
The chapter then concluded with a description of possible
and probable results of recent Kenyan Government policies
toward the Asians,

CHAPTER IV
THE CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN TRIBAL
RELATIONSHIPS
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in some
detail the complexities of current African tribal relation
ships.

In the plural society of Kenya, the quality of

relationships within the dominant African group will have
a profound effect on the as yet uncertain achievement of a
stable and viable political system.
The Crucial Question of National Unity
The morning after independence has brought a
^shock of recognition" of fragile underpinnings.
Building a new nation is a rough, unchartered
journey with many unanticipated problems.1
The most crucial social question in Kenya today is
whether or not the country can hang together.

The dynamics

of the problem lie within the great African majority and the
relationship of the primordial tribal groups. Will
^Lester G. Seligman, "Political Mobility and
Economic Development," in Smelser and Martin (eds.),
Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development,
p. 340.
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tribalism, the conflict of these tribal groupsdestroy
the unity of Kenya?
While sporadic cross-tribal violence broke out
soon after independence in 1963,

the first serious blow to

African national unity came when Vice President Oginga
Odinga withdrew from the government in April 1966»^

Shortly

thereafter, Odinga and several other members of Parliament
formed the Kenya People's Union (KPU).

The basis for the

KPU was primarily tribal in nature, for most of the leaders
including Odinga are Luos and the party is strongest in the
western area of Kenya around Lake Nyanza (Victoria) where
the Luos predominate.
A second setback for post-independence African
unity came on July 5, 1969, with the assassination of
Mr. Tom Mboya, the Minister for Economic Affairs and
Secretary-General of KANU.

Mboya was an important and

^"Tribalism," as it is used here, is only one of
several definitions of the term» Tribalism has also been
used to refer to "traditionalism" or "cultural conserva
tism" and to "ruralism" as opposed to "urbanism." For a
discussion of this multiple usage see Pierre L» van den
Berghe, "Introduction," in Africa: Social Problems of
Change and Conflict, ed, Pierre L, van den Berghe
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965), p. 440.
^Fighting was reported in July 1964 along the Rift
Valley and Western Region boundaries which left 1,200 home
less, one dead and several injured. The New York Times,
July 22, 1964, p. 21, Oginga Odinga describes the same
incident in his book Not Yet Uhuru as being between the
Maragoli and Nyangori tribal groups.
^See Odinga, especially pp. 275-315«
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perhaps essential agent in the maintenance of cross-tribal
unity in Kenya under the Kenyatta Government. For although
he was a Luo, Mboya was a strong voice in Kenyatta's cabi
net and party.

He had personally built for himself a

multitribal backing that he demonstrated by his election to
Parliament from a predominantly Kikuyu constituency.

Mboya

was commonly recognized, moreover, as having great economic
and political planning ability.5

His murder (by a Kikuyu)

brought to the surface violent tribal conflict.
The violence was in evidence as President Kenyatta's
car was stoned by Luos as he attended funeral ceremonies for
Mboya in Nairobi.

A similar stoning occurred later in the

year when Kenyatta visited Mboya's home area in Nyanza
Province. In the second incident, police protecting
Kenyatta opened fire on the attacking crowd, killing 11 and
injuring 70.^

Given the strong charismatic nature of

Kenyatta, these violent attacks represent a dramatic break
down in tribal relations.

Mzee himself was reportedly

extremely shaken by the experiences and began to initiate
a practice of oathing by fellow Kikuyus.

The oaths, which

invoked memories of the Mau Mau days, were supposedly
pledges by the Kikuyu to seek or keep control of Kenya in
^See John Hatch, "Kenya After Mboya," New Statesman,
LXXVIII, No, 2000 (July 11, 1969).
%ewsweek, November 10, 1969, p. 8.
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their own hands» 7
Masinde Mulurio, an M.P. and leader in the Abaluhya
tribe,

Kenya's third largest, commented in Parliament in

August that "the whole country felt unsafe and was asking
d
what the Kikuyu were doing,"
By October 1969, The New York
Times reported that;

"Church sources with wide acquaintance

in Kikuyuland report that 90^ of the tribe's members have
Q

taken part in the illegal ceremonies."
The news emanating from Kenya in late 1969 told of
increasing tribal conflict.The prospect that President
Kenyatta could hold the country together without resorting
to force was increasingly diminished as he lost cross-tribal
11
appeal.

W, Apple Jr.; "Tribal Emotions Deepen in
Kenya," T h e New York Times, August 20, 1969, p® 11» Some
reports had oathing ceremonies at Kenyatta's private resi
dence at Gatundu. See R. W, Apple Jr., "Kenyatta Fading
As Unity Symbol in Wave of Tribalism," The New York Times.
October 13> 1969» p» 8,
^Apple, "Tribal Emotions Deepen in Kenya,"
p . 11.
^Apple, "Kenyatta Fading As Unity Symbol," p. 8.
"'Members of the Kipsigis tribe, for example, were
said to have forced out all Kikuyu living near the Kip
sigis home area around Kericho,
llSee Apple, "Kenyatta Fading As Unity Symbol,"
p. 8,
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Historical Background to Contemporary
Relationships
Tribal conflict has probably existed to some degree
in Kenya ever since the ancestors of the modern tribes came
19
into contact—about 500 years ago»
Some authors believe
that early tribal relationships, although mistrustful or
13
even hostile, were characterized by little violence.
This
assertion cannot be proven with any certainty, but it is
known, however, that in the early 19th Century conflict
between tribes grew.

This friction probably resulted from

the pressures of overpopulation and the aid given by some
Africans to Arab and Portuguese slavers.
British entry into Kenya, although it brought an
end to slavery, eventually created a new division between
African tribes which has current significance»

The British

brought to Africa as part of the "white man's burden" the
"Western Way," which introduced individualism, science,
technology and the desire to accumulate wealth. The
African response to the Western Way was not uniform.

The

Kikuyu, for example, quickly adopted and adapted the new
way to their traditional behavior, Paul Bohannan terms the
I^See pp. 24-25,
Colin M. Turnbull, The Lonely African
(New York: Simon and Schuster ^ 1'96217 esp©ciaIly" p. 245,
and Davidson, p, 168,
''%ee Davidson,
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modern Kikuyu a '^driven people" who act much like 18th or
19th Century capitalists with goals of "greater achieve
ment, wealth and ease^

James Coleman attributes the

Kikuyu response partly to certain traditional culture
traits such as a "general absence of chiefs, smallness in
scale and the democratic character of indigenous political
organization, /and7 emphasis on achieved status and indivi
dualism," all of which parallels similar traits among the
Ibo people of eastern Nigeria.
In general, it may be said that Peasant tribes such
as the Kikuyu17 more quickly and readily adopted the Western
Way than did Pastoral tribes such as the Masai, Turkana or
Galla.

The Pastorals have resisted change for several
reasons,1 A
1.

Traditional special work functions among the

Pastorals have somewhat inhibited work activities in a
modern economy.
2o

Pastorals have a traditional aristocratic

I^Bohannan, pp. 27-28.
l6james S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical
Africa," The American Political Science Review. XLVIII,
No. 2 (June 1954), 413.
^^See Thurnwald's Peasant-Pastoral divisions on
p. 15 and Table 3 above.
I^for a discussion of this resistance see Thurnwald, p. 102.
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self-opinion which was approbated during British rule.
3.

There is a continuing attraction to the

traditional ways among the Pastorals because it was through
this traditional manner of life that they had acquired
power and prestige during precolonial days.
As African reaction to the Western Way was uneven,
so too was their reaction to British rule. Dr. Gikonyo
Kiano, Kenya's Minister for Education, remarked before
Uhuru that; "The desire to be rid of the colonial govern
ment is the nearest thing we have to 'one-ness' or to being
a nation.This statement, while true, must be qualified
with the fact that even in the anti-colonial struggle there
was not total African unity; for that struggle was in great
part a Kikuyu struggle.

As Coleman writes:

"In Kenya,

Mau Mau and all earlier proto-nationalist movements have
been predominantly Kikuyu endeavors, even though the name
20

Kenya has been employed."

Current African Relationships
Despite official government avoidance of the term
"tribe," the tribal social group carried over into the
period since independence.

This persistence may be

I^Quoted in Susan Wood, Kenya; The Tensions of
Progress (London; Oxford University Press, 1960), p. T7.
^Ocoleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa,"
p. 421.
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explained in part by general theory on the nature of social
groups.

Thus Abner Cohen writes:

. . o traditional groups are highly tenacious in the
face of change. And when their members are held
together not only by common customs and values but
also by vital economic and political interests, these
groups struggle hard to retain their autonomy.21
Lester G. Seligman says much the same in his comment on pri
mordial group reaction to the phenomenon of nationalism:
o o o the new nationalism itself stimulates and
reinforces the old parochial loyalties. In many
instances traditional groups become more appre
hensive and militant about preserving their own
identity and status.22
Tom Mboya offers an explanation for continued con
flict or tribalism in writing:
When a leader feels himself weak on the
national platform he begins to calculate that the
only support he may have will come from his own
tribe; so he starts to create an antagonism of
this sort; to entrench himself as at least a
leader of his tribe.23
Mboya's point here is that the persistent strength of the
tribal unit and the incidence of cross-tribal hostility may
be deliberately manipulated from above.

Thus tribal

Abner Cohen, "The Politics of Mysticism in Some
Local Communities in Newly Independent African States," in
Local Level Politics, ed. Marc J. Swartz (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Co., 1968), p. 362. John C„ Calhoun wrote suc
cinctly for another place and age that: "Self-preserva
tion is the supreme law, as well with communities as indi
viduals," John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government
(New York: Poli Sci Classics^ 1947)> p. 10.
22Lester G. Seligman, p. 345.
23Mboya, p. 66.
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identity and strife may be promoted by both the calculated
effort of leaders and the spontaneous tribal group reaction
to social change.
Whatever the explanations, tribalism is a commonly
acknowledged fact of the Kenyan society today.

Since 1963?

the Kikuyu, as members of the most educated and "modern"
of the tribal groups, have fallen heir to government busi
ness and agricultural positions vacated by the departing
British.

The extent of this take-over is difficult to

document, but what is evident is a widespread resentment
among other Africans at what they consider to be tribal
favoritism in job hiring and farm and business establishment
purchase. For example, a recent poll cited in a book
written in 196? showed that 63% of the Kenyan people felt
that tribal favoritism existed in the Kenyan civil service.
Additional evidence of tribalism in Kenya today can
be found in stereotype comments which Africans make about
other tribes.

The author heard many such comments, usually

^John S. Roberts, A Land Full of People: Life in
Kenya Today (New York; Praeger, 1967), p. 63. What
Roberts did not reveal, unfortunately, was a tribal break
down, if one existed, of this 68^. It would have been
interesting to see, for example, how many Kikuyu were
included among this category.
The author remembers many incidents in which
Africans spoke of favoritism for Kikuyu, One young Nandi
government farm administrator, for example, said with
bitterness but resignation that he had been in line for a
promotion but was passed over through such favoritism for
a Kikuyu subordinate.
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phrased as well-intentioned admonishments for the uniniti
ated foreigner.

Thus in reference to the Kikuyu one hears:

"Don't marry a Kikuyu; she'll run away and steal all your
money and children."
Kikuyu is;

Another common statement about the

"Don't enter into any business agreements with

the Kikuyu; they'll cheat you."

The assumption of such

statements is that the Kikuyu (who are called "Kukes" by
some urban Africans) are dishonest.
Comments about the Masai and other more traditional
tribes by more "educated" or urbanized Africans show an
assumption that the traditional tribes are backward or
savage.

Thus the author has been told: "I pity you living

with the Masai; you'd be better off with some 'civilized'
Africans."
Many Africans, in talking about the Luo people,
reveal their feeling that all Luos are unclean.

This idea

stems from the fact that the Luos, unlike the members of
almost every other major tribe in Kenya, perform neither
male nor female circumcision,^^
ment;

Thus one hears the com

"Never marry a Luo; they're a dirty lot,"

^^Another major exception is the Turkana tribe.
Female circumcision, or clitoridectomy, is probably much
less common in Kenya today than it was before the arrival
of the British,
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The Possibility and Implications of the
Emergence of Classes in Kenya
In an earlier section, the possibility was discussed
of the emergence of classes in Kenya as a result of govern
ment failures to implement the distributive aspect of
African Socialism.The relevance of such an emergence to
the current Asian-African conflict has also been examined
But growing economic and social differences between Africans
have implications, also, for current African tribal rela
tions.
Several authors have examined the widespread desire
for a better quality of life which emerged in colonial
p

areas after World War II.

This desire, often termed the

"revolution of rising expectations," has not been limited to
a yearning for consumer goods, but has included aspirations
of education for oneself and one's children, improved health,
and opportunities for new acquaintances, skills and
respect.
^^See pp. 53-5^ above.
27see pp. 77-7# above,
^%ee especially the works of: Vera Micheles Dean,
The Nature of the Non-Western World (New York: Mentor
Books, 1966); Barbara Ward, The Kjch Nations and the Poor
Nations (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962); and Max F.
Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer (eds.), The Emerging
Nations (Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1961).
29Millikan and Blackmer, pp. 43-44»
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In addition to its material, non-material aspects,
the concept of rising expectations is further complicated
by the fact that the desires are aggravated by a growing
realization of poverty in relation to other richer men.
Before the arrival of Asians and Europeans in Kenya, the
Africans there did not feel relatively poor or deprived.
The tribes in Kenya, as elsewhere in Africa, were on a
relatively equal level of development»

Even within the

tribes, economic class distinctions were absent.

In the

subsistence economy only rudimentary differentiations of
labor existed.

Wealth, even if accumulated, was consumed

rather than stored; the status divisions were based on sex,
age and demonstrated leadership ability rather than
wealth.
Africans have become aware of their relative depri
vation through personal contacts with foreigners and the
spread of mass communications. But following independence,
new meaning has been lent to the sense of deprivation by
^Ogee Paul Bohannan, p. 24.
3''See M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, African
Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press" 1940).
For studies dealing specifically with Kenya's tribes see;
Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya; G. W. B. Huntingford, The
Nandi of Kenya; Tribal Control in a Pastoral Society
(London; Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953); J « B„ Peristainy. The Social Institutions of the Kipsigis (New York;
The Humanities Press, 1939; and the novel by James Ngugi,
The River Between (London; Heinemann, 1965).
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growing socio-economic divisions within the African racial
group itself.

Initially, distinctions of wealth between

Africans probably did not create hostility; on the contrary,
poorer Africans must have felt pride in observing that
other Africans could succeed in the new system of the
Western Way.

As time goes on, however, as lines become

more clearly drawn between rich and poor, the sense of
deprivation must surely grow and class conflict will begin.
African Overconfidence
Before Independence
Africans believed, prior to independence, that such
class conflict could be avoided once Kenya gained uhuruo
They knew, of course, that class conflict had not been a
part of the traditional tribal societies.

Many Africans

were very optimistic, too, that Kenya would be able to
satisfy the new expectations once the Europeans left.

Thus

the feeling among Kenya's Africans was that an independent
government could, by combining traditional classless values
with the profitability of running one's own country, avoid
a society of African classes after Uhuru,

This feeling lies

at the root of African Socialism,
The African optimism preceding independence was a
phenomenon not limited to Kenya, Such optimism was in
evidence in several African colonies.

The more informed

Africans felt that the colonists had reaped huge profits in
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Africa and that independence would make these profits
available for distribution to the inhabitants of the
former colonies.
Among the African masses economic anticipations
were more fanciful than among the more informed.

Thus

Oginga Odinga writes:
Some people thought that independence meant
the end of the struggle and all would be in order
in a new Kenya. Some people in the villages
thought that there was lots of money in the bank
and Kenya would give it all to us, that money
could be printed easily enough,33
Now, several years after independence, the hard
realistic facts which make economic development an arduous
task are being recognized by the African governments.

The

new nations are facing difficulties in finding the capital
and developing the skills, energy and initiative necessary
for development.^^
The Connection Between
Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy
The challenge of surmounting economic difficulties
and of meeting rising expectations is of crucial importance
for Kenya and the other newly independent societies of the
3^See Ferkiss, pp. 74-75.
33odinga, p. 242.
3^See Hunter; also Robert L. Heilbroner, The Great
Ascent (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 19d3T"^
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w o r l d , T o fail would be to jeopardize the very legiti
macy of the new governments.

Max Weber has identified

three approaches by which an authority may gain legitimacy.
These are:
1.

Through tradition.

2.

Through charismatic appeal,

3.

Through rational legal authority.

The newly independent Kenyatta Government had, of
course, precious little tradition upon which to rely.

Neve

before had other tribes experienced leadership by a Kikuyu,
The charismatic method of gaining legitimacy is dependent
upon Kenyatta's ability to maintain and develop his image
in Kenya's plural society as Mzee, the "Father of Kenya,"
35see the writings of: Lester G. Seligman; Martin
Kilson, "African Political Change and the Modernization
Process," Journal of Modern African Studies, I (1963);
Coser; Hunter; and especially Edward Shils, "The Military
in the Political Development of the New States," in The
Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed,
John J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J,; Princeton University
Press, 1962); Edward Shils, Political Development in the
New States ('s-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co,, 1962); and
Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States,
in Old Societies and New States; The Quest for Modernity
in Asia and Africa, ed, Clifford Geertz (New York; The
Free Press, 1963),
^^For a discussion of these approaches see Seymour
Martin Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: Basic
Books Inc., 1963), especially p, f?®

'106

and indeed on his ability at an old age37 to continue
living.

The third method of gaining legitimacy, through

rational legal authority, hinges on a government's ability
to demonstrate its effectiveness.

If it is true that "for

the new nations today, demonstrating effectiveness means
one thing, economic development,then this third method
of gaining legitimacy is dependent on economic development.
The proof of economic development, for the people of Kenya
and the other new nations, will be found in the satisfac
tion of rising expectations.

This fact is what makes the

fulfillment of the expectations so crucially important for
Kenya.
The Danger in the Correlation of Class
with Tribe
The importance of rising expectations and emerging
classes in Kenya has great relevance for the relationship
of the African tribes.

If a correlation begins to develop

between emerging classes and traditional tribal groups,
then a dangerous threat will also develop for African unity
and harmony.

Even in old established societies such as

those of the United States and Northern Ireland the coinci
dence of primordial distinctions of race or religion with
^^Kenyatta was born in I89O. The World Almanac
( 1970 Edition), ed. Luman H. Long (New York: Newspaper
Enterprise ^Assoc. Inc., 1970), p. 573 «
3^Lipset, p. 46.
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socio-economic class differences produces dramatic tensionso
In the plural society of Kenya, if one tribe begins to out
distance other tribes in its economic development (as the
Kikuyu tribe may well be doing), then tribal conflict is
imminent and the legitimacy of the political union in Kenya
is threatened.

To go one step further, if the Kikuyu

attempt by oathing or by other means to buttress the
threatened government by seeking to consolidate their own
tribal hegemony, then the government will only be preserved
through a great effort of force and repression.

Socio

economic differences in correlation with primordial divi
sions are at the core of the Asian-African conflict, and
they may well lead in the near future to an intensified
African tribal struggle.
Summary
The attempt in this chapter has been to focus on
the very important African tribal relationships.

The

quality of these relationships and the outcome of the
effort to avoid a class structure in Kenya will be of
primary importance to the unity of that country.

CHAPTER V
PRIMORDIAL GROUPS IN KENYA AND ELSEWHERE
In this final chapter the author reverts to the
theme of primordial groups first presented in the Intro
duction.

The attempt here will be to analyze primordial

groups as political groups, to show their qualitative
distinctions and possible uses in future studies.
Kenya As a Plural Society
The idea that Kenya possesses a plural society was
first presented in the Introduction,^ and the discussion
which followed was, in part, an attempt to demonstrate or
prove this plural nature for Kenya's society.

Several

pertinent observations may be drawn from the discussion:
1, Because of a relative absence of value con
sensus, conflict rather than consensus characterizes Kenya's
society.
^See pp. 1-3. For an introductory work on the
theory of plural societies see Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith
(eds.), Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of Galifôrnia Press, 1969). Significant
writings on plural societies include those by Smith, Kuper,
van den Berghe and Furniwall. (See bibliography for
complete listing.)
108

109

2.

There exists in Kenya a relative rigidity and

clarity of group definition.
3.

Kenya's society also displays a relative segmen

tation in the character of group relationships»

Integrated

behavior is not typical in Kenya. Social institutions cor
respond to rather than overlap the primordial group boun
daries.

The manner in which individuals of separate groups

act toward one another is restricted and ritualized.
As evidence of the social cleavages and divisions
in Kenya, five different sets of primordial groups were
examinedÎ
1.

The Asian Racial Group

2.

The African Tribal Groups

3. The Asian Racial Group
4o

The Asian Caste-Sect Groups

5.

The European Racial Group

Primordial Groups As Political Groups
All social groups have interests,2 and because pri
mordial groups are a special type or category of social
^Thus Arthur F. Bentley writes: "There is no group
without its interest. An interest . „ „ is the equivalent
of a group. We may speak also of an interest group or a
group interest, again merely for the sake of clearness in
expression. The group and the interest are not separate.
There exists only the one thing, that is, so many men bound
together in or along the path of a certain activity."
Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study
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groups, they too have interests.

Some, but not all,

social groups are also political groups, that is, they
direct their interest or activity in an attempt to influence
government policy.

The discussion of Kenya showed primor

dial groups in that country performing such an activity.
A qualification must be recognized here in that it is
theoretically possible to conceive of a relatively weak
primordial group out of one of the five aforementioned sets
which is apolitical.

Such apolitical behavior is not likely

to be the case, however, and it is certainly not the norm.
Whenever there is contact between a primordial group and
government, that primordial group takes on a political
interest.

The very act of claiming official recognition

as a group (even if it is only to be recognized as such in
a census) makes the primordial group political.

The pri

mordial groups of Kenya can, with justification, be called
political groups.
The act of raising Kenya's primordial groups to the
level of political groups makes possible the comparison of
the primordial groups with other types of political groups.
Differences and distinctions can be demonstrated in a con
sideration of political group origins and activities.
Social Pressures (Bloomington, Ind.:
1949), p. 211.

Principia Press,
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Qualitative Distinctions of Kenya's
Primordial Groups As
Political Groups
A Social Basis
In societies less plural than Kenya's, the origin
of political groups is more likely to center on economic
rather than social cleavages.

Thus in the relatively

homogeneous American society no student of politics could
afford to ignore such significant political groups as the
labor unions, business associations or occupational organi
zations.

Even before the United States had its Constitu

tion, it was concluded in Federalist Number 10 that
. . the most common and durable source of factions has
been the various and unequal distribution of property."3
In Kenya, however, economic groups play a far less
important function and the prime factor in political group
formation thus far has been primordial social attraction.
Several reasons account for this tendency for primordial
groups to form and become politically active.
1.

Economic and social differences have often

coincided in Kenya,

When the racial pyramid was formed

with Europeans on the top, Asians in the middle and
Africans on the bottom, the hierarchy was both economic
and social in nature.
^The Federalist (New York:
lÔÔÔ), p. 54c

G. P. Putnam's Sons,
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2o

Primordial sentiments have often coincided

with territorial possession.

Each African tribe had its

own traditional area, and the Europeans looked upon the
Highlands as their own region. The Mau Mau struggle was
to a great degree a dispute based on conflicting land
claims »
3o

Some primordial groups have been intentionally

made participants in the political system. Through
Indirect Rule the colonial government recognized the
African tribes as political units.

Through communal repre

sentation all three racial groups participated in the
governmental policy-making process.
4o

One set of primordial groups, the African

tribes, had at one time their own separate and distinct
societies.
Primordial Groups and
Common Social Value's"
Value consensus, by very definition, exists to a
greater degree in a more homogeneous society than it does
in a more plural society.

The degree of value consensus

in a society is directly related to the range of activities
of political groups in that society. When a high degree of
consensus exists in a society, the political groups will be
much more likely to accept as "given" the legitimacy of the
political system and the "rules of the political game."
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The evidence does not indicate that the primordial
groups of Kenya have yet accepted common social values.
The European group, for example, came close to revolution
in its reaction to the Wood-Winterton Agreement of 1922.^
During the Emergency and Mau Mau rebellion the Kikuyu
tribe, or at least a large percentage of that group,
attacked the legitimacy of colonial rule.

Since indepen

dence, the Somali tribe has fought inclusion within the
Kenyan society.

Thus the repertory of possible political

actions by the primordial groups includes violent action
against government in an attempt to overthrow the political
system or to opt out of society altogether.
The Primordial Groups
and Kenya's Boundaries
The case of the Somali tribe of northeast Kenya
points to another distinctive socio-political feature of
the primordial groups in Kenya.

Some of the primordial

groups, such as the Somali, overlap into neighboring
countries and are thereby cut by the international boun
daries,

Primordial groups which are so split fall into

two different categories:
1.

Groups which are divided by the fact that the

border cuts a primordial group population and its tradi
tional territory.

Examples include the Somali, Masai and

^See pp. 35-36 above.
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and Abaluhya tribes,
2,

Groups whose population only is divided.

Examples here include the Asian racial group and the
Asian caste-sect groups.^
The tendency for primordial groups which are com
pletely contained within Kenya's national boundaries is to
fear and resist the political power and authority of the
national government. This tendency is much more marked for
those primordial groups which have traditional territories.
The tendency to resist the national authority was quite
evident, for example, in the initial tribal response to
British attempts to colonize Kenya.
For those primordial groups which are divided by
Kenya's national boundaries and are residing therefore in
both Kenya and a neighboring country there have been two
separate tendencies.

The groups have tended either to

resist the authority of both national governments or to
resist one government and accept the other.

These tenden

cies have, once again, been more marked for those primordial
groups which have traditional territories (i.e. the groups
of category 1 )..
The Masai tribe provides one example of a divided
primordial group from category 1. The Masai, who are
^There were in I960 about 87,000 Asians in Tanzania
and about 75,000 in Uganda. Delf, pp. 54-48,

115

divided by the boundary between Kenya and Tanzania, have
tended to resist the authority of both national govern
ments.

A second example of a primordial group from cate

gory 1 is the Somali tribe which is divided by the KenyaSomali Republic boundary.

The tendency for the Somali

tribesmen has been to resist violently the attempts by the
Kenyan Government to extend its authority over them.

These

tribesmen have not tended to act similarly, however, towards
the national government of the Somali Republic.

Because

of an attachment to the Somali society (an attachment based
on common primordial ties), the Somali tribe has given
evidence of an eagerness to become part of the Somali
society and to accept the authority of the Somali Government.
The Performance of Interest Articulation
by Kenya's Primordial Groups^
Latent and Manifest Interests
The interests of the primordial groups in Kenya
have, at times, been conspicuous or manifest.

The African

tribes openly fought British imperialism. The Asian EAING
&This section on interest articulation applies some
ideas developed by Gabriel Almond and George I. Blanksten
in their discussions of political groups. See: Gabriel À,
Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative
Politics," in The Politics of the Developing Areas, ed,
Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, I960), pp. 33-34; and George I.
Blanksten, "Political Groups in Latin America," The American
Political Science Review, LIII, No, 1 (March 1959), 106-12?.
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overtly resisted colonial racial policies.

The Europeans

publicly protested the Wood-Winterton Agreement.
Very often, however, the primordial group interests
have been concealed or latent.

Such concealment reflects,

in part, a repressive political history in Kenya.

The full

resentment of the Kikuyu tribe, for example was only made
manifest when frustrated tribal members were motivated to
turn to violence and Mau Mau activities for the expression
of their rejection of colonial racism.
But in addition to the repressive nature of Kenya's
political system, the common inclination of primordial
groups to have latent political interests reflects a dis
tinctive quality of these groups.

Clifford Geertz has

perceived latent articulation to be a common feature of
primordial political groups (he terms them "-political
solidarities") throughout the newly independent nations of
the world. "Primordially based political solidarities,"
he writes, ""have a deeply abiding strength in most of the
new states, but it is not always an active and immediately
apparent one."

Rather, the political interest is latent,

". . . lying concealed in the enduring structure of pri
mordial identification, ready to take explicit political
form given only the proper sorts of social conditions. . . .
^Geertz, p. 114*
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Two examples of primordial group political interest
latency in Kenya are found in the activities of the Asian
caste-sect groups and the Kipsigis tribal group.

The

existence of the Asian caste-sect groups explains for the
most part the political weakness of the Asian racial group.
Because the Asians are divided into so many strong sub
groups, they have not been able to take a united political
stand.

The fact that the Asian caste-sect groups have

strong interests is not, however, readily apparent.

Very

often these interests have remained well-concealed and the
only surface evidence has been the political weakness of
the Asian racial group.
In somewhat similar fashion, the interests of the
Kipsigis tribal group have remained concealed since inde
pendence.

The Kipsigis people, like many other Kenyans,

have become increasingly resentful of the growing political
and economic strength of the Kikuyu tribe.

This resentment

was hidden for the most part, however, until the recent
upsurge in tribalism when the Kipsigis ejected Kikuyus
from the traditional area of the Kipsigis tribe.^

Only

then did the group interests surface.
There is a politically secret or latent aspect to
Kikuyu oathing as well.

No one knows for sure who has

taken the oath and who has not.
^See footnote 10, p. 94.

The political interest of
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these oaths remains concealed, "ready to take explicit
political form," as Geertz writes, "given only the proper
sorts of social conditions. , ,
Associational and NonAssociational Articulation
Sometimes, when the political interest of the
primordial group was expressed, it was done so in an
organized manner.

The primordial group could then be

called politically associational.

The EAINC , for example,

performed the function of political articulation for the
Asian Racial Group.
KANU, the present ruling party, has enough of a
multigroup membership to preclude calling any primordial
group associational on the basis of the party's existence.
It might be argued, however, that the KPU performed a
political interest articulation function for the Luo
g
tribe.
If so, then the Luo tribe was politically associ
ational until the KPU was banned in 1969.
Specific and General Interests
An important feature of Kenya's primordial groups
is that while they have expressed specific interests,
i.e. interests pertaining to a particular policy, these
specific interests are very often only parts of more broad
%ee p. 92 above.
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or general interests.
This tendency toward general interests is demon
strated in the activities of the three racial groups in
Kenya. The European group, for example, demanded specifi
cally that Asians be excluded from land in the Highlands,
but this demand was only part of a general European group
interest.

In this paper the general European group

interest has been termed the European Racist Syndrome
In a similar manner, the Asian group fought against
the specific colonial policy of urban segregation.

Once

again, however, this Asian action was but a part of a
general Asian group interest in rejecting the whole range
of colonial racist policies.
The African group, under Mboya's leadership,
fought the specific policy of multiracial rule for Kenya.
But as with the Europeans and Asians, this specific African
action was only part of a general group interest.

In this

case, the general African interest was in achieving inde,pendence.
James Coleman emphasizes the general interests of
primordial groups throughout underdeveloped nations in
observing the "critical fact" of these nations is that
"interests still tend to be defined predominantly in terms
of tribe, race, religion, or communal reference
lOgee pp. 19-21 above.

120

group.^
Possible Benefits of Using the Primordial
Group Concept
The reference to primordial groups has, to this
point, been limited to the five sets of primordial groups
in Kenya,

This limited reference was done with purpose,

for although other authors have written about "primordial
attachments," "primordially based political solidarities"
and ""primordial loyalties," the concept of primordial
groups is original with this paper.

The proof of the use

fulness of the primordial group concept, it was felt, must
first come in a demonstration of its productive application
in the analysis of a single country's socio-political
system.
The fact, however, that authors such as James
Coleman, Clifford Geertz and David E, Apter have employed
the idea of primordial attachments in discussing several
countries1 ? suggests that the concept of primordial groups
James S. Coleman, "Conclusion? The Political
Systems of the Developing Areas," in Almond and Coleman,
p. 535.
1^See the quotations by Geertz (p. 1l6) and Cole
man (p. 119) above. Apter writes that: "The first problem
faced by the new nations is that of creating over-arching
loyalties that will transcend the primordial ones of ethnic
membership, religious affiliation, and linguistic identi
fication," David E, Apter, The Politics of Modernization
(Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pT 294.
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might have further significance.
The following discussion lists three possible appli
cations for the primordial group concept in political
science,
The Ill-Defined Boundaries
of Political Systems
The primordial group concept is useful in that in
many countries such as Kenya boundaries between the politi
cal systemand other systems within the society are not
clear cut,
Gabriel Almond writes:
Political scientists know in a general way that
political control in a society is just one of a num
ber of social control systems, such as religion, the
family, the economic organization, and the like.
What he /sic7 is less likely to be aware of is the
fact that the form and control of the political system
in a society will vary with the form and content of
the religious, family, and other systems in a
society. . , . The essential point here is that crucial
interrelations which we may miss when we examine the
fully differentiated, more or less autonomous political
system in the West stand out more clearly in primitive
and non-Western contexts.14
By utilizing primordial groups we can easily get at
1^Gabriel Almond's definition of political system
is employed in this paper. He writes:
* . the political
system is that system which performs the functions of inte
gration and adaptation (both internally and vis-a-vis other
societies) by means of the employment, or threat of employ
ment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion."
Almond and Coleman, p. 7.
"'^Almond and Coleman, p. 10.
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these "crucial relationships" between political and other
control systems.

Such relationships were demonstrated for

Kenya to the extent that the five sets of primordial groups
played political functions.
The relevance of primordial groups to the political
systems in non-Western nations varies somewhat from country
to country.

In Africa such relevance is dependent especi

ally on the nature of the colonial rule; the nature of the
integrative influence; the size, cohesion and compatibility
of the groups; and the stability or fragility of national
institutions.But the relevance of even non-associational,
latently articulate primordial groups in Africa and elsewhere
should not be overlooked.^^
The Basic Problem in
Plural Societies
A second reason for the employment of the primordial
group concept is that it clearly exposes the basic problem
in plural societies such as Kenya's--the problem of holding
together.

As Clifford Geertz writes:

I^See James S. Coleman and Carl G, Rosberg Jr.,
Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical
Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1966), p. 6ÔÔ0
1&This fact has not, of course, gone unrecognized.
See the works of such students of non-Western societies
as Hunger, Paliers, Skinner and Southall. (See biblio
graphy for complete listing.)
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Economic or class or intellectual disaffection
threatens revolution, but disaffection based on race,
language, or culture threatens partition, irredentism,
or merger, a redrawing of the very limits of the
state, a new definition of its domain.17
It is an interesting historical fact that the
approach of independence for colonial societies very often
brought about an unstable social situation leading to in
creased rather than decreased primordial group conflict.
A new self-awareness of social group identity was fostered
during this period which coupled with growing demands for
self-determination.

Often times the social group boun

daries did not correspond to colonial-drawn national
boundaries, and the push for self-determination threatened
to destroy those boundaries. Ideas of self-determination
may be rooted, also, in fears of continued domination by a
new group or coalition of groups.

This fear took expression

in Kenya in the formation of KADU by several smaller tribes
which were apprehensive about a possible Kikuyu-Luo hegemony
at independence.
In many of the new nations, and especially in
Africa, unity is still threatened by the micro-nationalism
^^Geertz, p. 111.
I^See Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The
Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples
(Cambridge, Mass.r Harvard University Press, 1960),
pp. 329-359; James S. Coleman, "The Politics of SubSaharan Africa," in Almond and Coleman, p. 31â; and Cole
man and Rosberg, pp. 688-690.
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of primordial groups and the syncretic process is still
menaced by primordial attachments.

An understanding of

primordial groups is basic to the study of these nations
because it locates the social units which produce the
plural societies and reveals the ties and conflicts between
these units.

James Coleman and Carl G„ Rosberg write;

. . . in the new states JZf Africa7, the politically
relevant cultures are not those of the new nations
the state builders are seeking to create; rather,
they are those of the hundreds of heterogeneous
ethnic communities and tribal societies arbitrarily
bunched together within the artificial boundaries
imposed during the colonial period.19
Myron Weiner has distinguished five types of integration being pursued today in the new nations.

p r\

These

are:
1.

National integration, the unification of

"culturally and socially discrete groups,"
2.

Territorial integration, the extension of the

authority of the national government over the national
territory.
3.

Value integration, the acceptance of procedures

for conflict resolution.
4.

Elite-mass integration, the briding of class

"'^Colemàn and Rosberg, p. 2.
20Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political
Development," The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science. CCCLVIII (March 1965).
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divisions «
5.

Integrative behavior, the acceptance of pro

cedures for working together.
Overcoming primordial group differences is a
function of

, national integration, but the following

examples from Kenya illustrate the fact that the existence
of primordial groups in Kenya affects every type of inté
grât ive effort.
Territorial integration.--The dispatch of Kenyan
troops to the northeast area of the country to quell the
Shifta uprising is clearly an attempt at territorial inte
gration

{§2).

The root of the problem, however, lies in

the primordial attachments of Somali tribesmen with their
brothers in the Somali Republic.
Value integration.--The Kenyan Government action in
maximizing uniformity by banning KPU is an effort to bringabout value integration. {§3) «

The basis for KPU, however,

was largely as an interest-articulating organization for a
primordial group--the Luo tribe.
Elite-mass integration.--The endeavor at elite-mass
integration (^4) in Kenya is, once again, complicated by
primordial group problems.

The new African elite in Kenya

comes mostly from peasant (mainly Kikuyu) rather than
pastoral tribes.

The significance of restricted recruitment

for the elite is shown in this quotation by Coleman and
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Rosberg:
When primordial loyalty coincides with, and is
therefore enormously fortified by, other interests
of an economic, social or class character, the
resulting combination is powerful, and virtually
indestructible. Throughout Africa, certain tribal,
linguistic, or ethnic groups are in a more advan
tageous competitive position than others.21
Integrative behavior.--The great interest shown by
members of the Asian Racial Group in involving themselves
as students and teachers in Kenya's educational system
demonstrates an attempt at Weiner's fifth type of integra
tive behavior, the acceptance of procedures for working
together.
Before leaving the discussion of the relationship
of primordial groups to the problem of integrating plural
societies, mention must be made of the fact that primordial
groups can play a functional role in these dynamic new
societies.

This role was not mentioned in the discussion

of Kenya's society, but some authors have seen benefits in
the existence of primordial tribal ties in the new African
states.
Tom Mboya and Max Gluckman both comment on the fact
that with rapid urbanization now taking place in Africa
some of the social, psychological and economic burdens in
the new states have been shouldered by the traditional
21 Coleman and Rosberg, p. 690.
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tribal groupso 22

Immanuel Wallerstein and James Coleman

have commented, in addition, on the political advantage
for an African nation in possessing a multiplicity of small
tribes (such as is the case in Tanzania, the country to
Kenya's immediate south).

These authors see more possi

bility for authoritarianism in a country which has many
small tribeso
A Possibility for CrossNational Comparisons
A final benefit to be gained from using the pri
mordial group concept is that it opens possibilities for
cross-national comparisons.

Such comparisons could be

either of two types.
1.

Comparisons could be made between primordial

political groups and political groups in more integrated
societies.

A start in this direction was made in this

chapter with the introduction of the idea that as political
groups the primordial groups of Kenya had some distinctive
features.

A logical next step would be to compare primor

dial groups as a type with descriptions of political groups
drawn largely from the American sample--descriptions
possibly by authors such as Arthur F. Bentley, Earl Latham,
^^Mboya, pp. 55-91 ; and Max Gluckman, "Tribalism in
Modern British Central Africa," in Social Change? The
Colonial Situation, ed. Immanuel Wallerstein (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1966),
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David B, Truman and Robert A„ Dahl.^^
2.

A second cross-national comparison could be

made between plural societies which contain primordial
groups.

Both Clifford Geertz and Pierre van den Berghe

see promise in such comparisons»^^

The process would

involve a gathering of data on the number, size and
relationships of primordial groups in several societies.
Comparisons then would hopefully reveal something of the
contrasting natures of those societies and expectations
for their futures»
Z^See the bibliography for relevant works by these
authors.
^^See Geertz, especially pp» 114-11#; and
van den Berghe, Race and Racism»
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APPENDIX

A

T r i b a l D i s t r i b u t i o n i n Kenya

BORAN

^^ARakvvet
BORAN

KIKUYU

Over 1,000,000

KISH

500,OCX)-999,999

NANDI

250,000

EMBU

100,000 - 249,999

) 0^

TAITA

499,999

SAMBURU

50,000 - 99,999

Cabbra

10,000 - 49,999

NJEMPS

Less than 10.000
100 Miles
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